
































      Quantitative Finance Research Centre 
 
Research Paper 233      October 2008 
 
 
Heterogeneity, Bounded Rationality and Market Dynsfunctionality 
 




 HETEROGENEITY, BOUNDED RATIONALITY, AND MARKET
DYSFUNCTIONALITY
XUE-ZHONG HE AND LEI SHI
School of Finance and Economics
University of Technology, Sydney
PO Box 123 Broadway
NSW 2007, Australia
ABSTRACT. As the main building blocks of the modern ﬁnance theory, homogeneity
and rational expectation have faced difﬁculty in explaining many market anomalies,
stylized factors, and market inefﬁciency in empirical studies. As a result, heterogene-
ity and bounded rationality have been used as an alterative paradigm of asset price
dynamics and this paradigm has been widely recognized recently in both academic
and ﬁnancial market practitioners. Within the framework of Chiarella, Dieci and He
(2006a, 2006b) on mean-variance analysis under heterogeneous beliefs in terms of
either the payoffs or returns of the risky assets, this paper examines the effect of the
heterogeneity. We ﬁrst demonstrate that, in market equilibrium, the standard one fund
theorem under homogeneous belief does not held under heterogeneous belief in gen-
eral, however, the optimal portfolios of investors are very close to the market efﬁcient
frontier. By imposing certain distribution assumption on the heterogeneous beliefs,
we then use Monte Carlo simulations to show that certain heterogeneity among in-
vestors can improve the Sharpe and Treynor ratios of the portfolios and investors can
beneﬁt from the diversity in investors’ beliefs. We also show that non-normality of
market equilibrium return distributions is an outcome of the market aggregation of
individual investors who make rational decisions based on their beliefs. Our results
explain the empirical funding that that managed funds under-perform the market in-
dex on average and show that heterogeneity can improve the market efﬁciency.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed simultaneously and indepen-
dently by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) is perhaps the most in-
ﬂuential object in modern ﬁnance. It provides the theoretical foundation for relating
risks linearly with expected return of a asset. It is found on the main building blocks of
the modern ﬁnance theory, i.e. homogeneity and rational expectation. However, from
a theoretical perspective this paradigm has been criticized on a number of grounds,
in particular concerning its extreme assumptions about homogeneous beliefs, and in-
formation about the economic environment and computational ability on the part of
the rational representative economic agent. Also, this paradigm has faced difﬁculty
in explaining many market anomalies, stylized factors, and market inefﬁciency in em-
pirical studies. As the result, heterogeneity and bounded rationality have been used
as an alterative paradigm of asset price dynamics and this paradigm has been widely
recognized in both academic and ﬁnancial market practitioners.
Literatures have made a signiﬁcant contribution to the understanding of the impact
of heterogeneous beliefs amongst investors on market equilibrium. Some have consid-
ered the problem in discrete time (for example, see Lintnter (1969), Rubinstein (1974)
and Sharpe (2007)) and others in continuous time (for example, see Williams (1977),
Detemple and Murthy (1994) and Zapatero (1998)). Equilibrium models have been de-
veloped to consider the impact of heterogeneity either in the mean-variance framework
(see, Lintner (1969) and William (1977)) or in the Arrow-Debreu contingent claims
economy (see, Rubinstein (1976), Abel (1989, 2002)). Given the bounded rationality
of investors, heterogeneity may be caused by difference in information or difference in
opinion. Intheﬁrstcase, investorsmayupdatetheirbeliefsasnewinformationbecome
available, Bayesian updating rule is often used (see, for example, Williams (1977) and
Zapatero (1998)). In the second case, investor may revise their portfolio strategies as
theirviewsofthemarketchangeovertime(see, forexampleLintner(1969)andRubin-
stein (1975)). However, in most of the literature, the impact of heterogeneous beliefs
is studied for the case of a portfolio of one risky asset and one risk-free asset (e.g.
Abel (1989), Basak (2000), Zapatero (1998) and Johnson (2004)). In those papers that
consider a portfolio of many risky assets and one risk-free asset, agents are assumed to
be heterogeneous in the risk preferences and expected payoffs or returns of the risky
assets (e.g. Williams (1977) and Varian (1985)), but not in the variances and covari-
ances, except the early contribution of Lintner (1969) in which heterogeneity in both
means and variances/covariances is investigated in a mean-variance portfolio context.
However, there is no reason to assume that investors are homogeneous in variance and
covariance matrix of the risky assets. As suggested by the empirical study in Chan
et al. (1999), while future variances and covariances are more easily predictable than
expected future returns, the difﬁculties in doing so should not be understated. These
authors argue that “While optimization (based on historical estimates of variances and
covariances) leads to a reduction in volatility, the problem of forecasting covariance
poses a challenge”.3
The main obstacle in dealing with heterogeneity is the complexity and heavy no-
tation involved when the number of assets and the dimension of the heterogeneity
increase. With the mean-variance framework with one risk-free asset and many risky
assets, amongst all the literatures mentioned above, Lintner (1969) is the only one con-
sidering market equilibrium and asset prices by allowing for heterogeneity not only in
theriskypreferencesandmeansoftheriskyassetsbutalsointhevariances/covariances
of the risky assets across agents. Surprisingly, this signiﬁcant contribution from Lint-
ner has not been paid much attention until recent years. This might be due to the
obstacle mentioned early, which makes the paper not easy to follow and to analyze.
Recently Chiarella, Dieci and He (2006a, 2006b) introduce the concept of consensus
belief and show that the consensus belief can be constructed explicitly as a weighted
average of the heterogeneous beliefs. They prove that the analysis of the heteroge-
neous beliefs model is equivalent to the analysis of a classical homogeneous model
with the consensus belief. In particular, they show that the market aggregate expected
payoffs/returnsoftheriskyassetscanbemeasuredbyaweightedaverageofthehetero-
geneousexpectedpayoffs/returnsoftheriskyassetsacrosstheagents, whilethemarket
equilibrium price is a weighted average of the equilibrium prices under the separate be-
liefs of each agent. Consequently, they establish an equilibrium relation between the
market aggregate expected payoff/returns of the risky assets and the market portfolio’s
expected payoff/returns, leading to a CAPM-like relation under heterogeneous beliefs.
As a special case, their result provides a simple explanation for the observed empirical
relation between cross-sectional volatility and expected returns, which is studied in
Miller (1977), Bart and Masse (1981), Diether et al. (2002), Johnson (2004) and Ang
et al. (2006).
Market exists because different investors trade each other for different purposes. At
the same time, investors make their optimal decisions based on their information and
beliefs. Among many questions on heterogeneity and bounded rationality, the question
why heterogeneity matters is one of the most important ones. In particular, what is the
impact of different heterogeneity on the market equilibrium and the optimal portfolios
of heterogeneous agents and what do we beneﬁt from marketwith manyheterogeneous
investors? It is the explicit construction of the consensus belief provided in Chiarella,
Dieci and He (2006a, 2006b) that makes the examination of those issues possible.
Within the framework of Chiarella, Dieci and He (2006a, 2006b) on mean-variance
analysis under heterogeneous beliefs in both payoff and return setups, this paper exam-
ines the above issues and questions, in particular the effect of the heterogeneity on the
market. The heterogeneity is measured in terms of the risk preferences (the absolute
risk aversion coefﬁcients), the expected payoffs/returns and the variance/covariance
matrices of the payoffs/returns of risky assets. We ﬁrst demonstrate that, under market
aggregation, the standard one fund theorem under homogeneous belief in the mean-
variance framework does not held in general. This offers a possible explanation on
the empirical funding that managed funds under-perform the market index on average.
However, in market equilibrium, the optimal portfolios of investors can be very close
to the market frontier, in particular when the beliefs are formed in asset returns. We4 HE AND SHI
call this property the quasi one fund theorem under the heterogeneity and bounded
rationality. To examine the market impact of the heterogeneity, we introduce certain
distribution assumptions on the different aspects of the heterogeneous beliefs. We then
use Monte Carlo simulations to show that certain heterogeneous beliefs, in particular
in asset returns, among investors can improve the Sharpe and Treynor ratios of the
optimal portfolios of investors and the market portfolio, implying that both investors
and market can beneﬁt from the diversity in investors’ beliefs. We call this property
the heterogeneity diversiﬁcation effect. We also show that non-normality of market
equilibrium return distributions is an outcome of the market aggregation of individual
investors who make rational decisions based on their beliefs.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the main results devel-
oped in Chiarella et al. (2006a, 2006b) when the heterogeneity is formed in payoffs
and returns of the risky assets. In Section 3, through numerical examples, we examine
the impact of the heterogeneity on the one fund theorem and the mean-variance efﬁ-
ciency of the optimal portfolios of heterogeneity under both setups. Section 4 presents
a statistic analysis on the market impact of the heterogeneity among two groups of
investors whose beliefs are characterized by certain distribution. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. MEAN-VARIANCE ASSET PRICING WITH HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS
In this section, we brieﬂy review the main results in Chiarella, Dieci and He (2006a,
2006b) on the asset pricing theory under the mean-variance framework with heteroge-
neous beliefs. The heterogeneous beliefs are formed in either the payoffs or returns
of the risky assets. In this paper, we consider the market impact of heterogeneity in
both setups in the beliefs. These results provide a foundation for our analysis in the
following sections.
2.1. Heterogeneous Beliefs in Asset Payoffs. We ﬁrst review the main result in
Chiarella et al. (2006a) in which the heterogeneous beliefs are formed in terms of
asset payoffs. The set up follows from the static mean-variance analysis. Consider a
market with one risk-free asset and K(¸ 1) risky assets. Let the current price of the
risk-free asset be 1 and its payoff be Rf = 1+rf. Let ~ x = (~ x1;¢¢¢ ; ~ xK)T be the payoff
vector of the risky assets, where ~ xk = ~ pk + ~ dk(k = 1;¢¢¢ ;K) correspond to the cum-
prices. Assume that there are I investors in the market indexed by i = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;I. The
heterogeneous (subjective) belief Bi = (Ei(~ x);­i) of investor i is deﬁned with respect
to the means, variances and covariances of the payoffs of the risky assets
yi = Ei(~ x) = (yi;1;yi;2;¢¢¢ ;yi;K)
T; ­i = (si;kl)K£K;
where
yi;k = Ei[~ xk]; si;kl = Covi(~ xk; ~ xl) (2.1)
for i = 1;2;¢¢¢I and k;l = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;K.5
Let zi;o and ¹ zi;o be the absolute amount and the endowment of investor i in the risk-
free asset, respectively, and
zi = (zi;1;zi;2;¢¢¢ ;zi;K)
T and ¹ zi = (¹ zi;1; ¹ zi;2;¢¢¢ ; ¹ zi;K)
T
be the risky portfolio and the endowment, respectively, of investor i in absolute amount
of the risky assets. Then the end-of-period wealth of the portfolio for investor i is
~ Wi = Rfzio + ~ x
Tzi:
Then, under the belief Bi, the expected value and variance of portfolio wealth ~ Wi are
given, respectively, by




i( ~ Wi) = z
T
i ­izi: (2.2)
Essentially, Chiarella, Dieci and He (2006a) assume that investor-i’s optimal invest-
ment portfolio is obtained by maximizing the certainty-equivalent of his/her future
wealth, Ci( ~ Wi) = Ei( ~ Wi)¡
µi
2 V ari( ~ Wi), where µi is the absolute risk aversion coefﬁ-
cient of investor i.
A market equilibrium is a vector of asset prices po determined by the individual
optimal demands z¤








¹ zi = zm; (2.3)
which deﬁnes a market portfolio of risky assets
1. To characterize the market equilib-
rium, a consensus belief is introduced.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A belief Ba = (Ea(~ x);­a), deﬁned by the expected payoff of the risky
assets Ea(~ x) and the variance and covariance matrix of the risky asset payoffs ­a,
is called a consensus belief if the market equilibrium price under the heterogeneous
beliefs is also the market equilibrium price under the homogeneous belief Ba.
Chiarella, Dieci and He (2006a) show how such a consensus belief can be explic-
itly constructed and how the market equilibrium price can be characterized by the
consensus belief in the following Proposition 2.2. Consequently, they obtain a CAPM-
like relation under heterogeneous beliefs, which is called the Heterogeneous CAPM
(HCAPM).




1If the risk-free asset is not in net zero supply at equilibrium, then the market portfolio also contains the
risk-free asset, hence the market portfolio is characterized by zm and zi;0.6 HE AND SHI







































































¯ = (¯1;¯2;¢¢¢ ;¯K)
T; ¯k =
cova(~ rm; ~ rk)
¾2
a(~ rm)
; k = 1;¢¢¢ ;K;
and the mean and variance/covariance of returns under the consensus belief
Ba are deﬁned similarly.
The equilibrium relation (2.8) is the standard CAPM except that the mean and vari-
ance/covariance are calculated based on the consensus belief Ba. The ¯ coefﬁcients of
risky assets depend upon not only the covariance between the market returns and asset
returns, but also the aggregation of the heterogeneous beliefs.
2.2. Heterogeneous Beliefs in Asset Returns. We now review the main result in
Chiarella et al. (2006b) in which the heterogeneous beliefs are formed in terms of asset
returns. The set up follows the static mean-variance analysis in Huang-Litzenberger
(1988). Consider a market with one risk-free asset and K(¸ 1) risky assets. Let rf be
the return of the riskless asset and ~ rj (j = 1;2;:::;K) be the return of the risky asset j.
Assume asset returns of the risky assets are multivariate normally distributed. Assume
that there are I investors in the market indexed by i = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;I with heterogeneous
(subjective) belief Bi = (Ei(~ r);Vi) that is deﬁned with respect to the means, variances
and covariances of the returns of the risky assets
¹i = Ei(~ r) = (¹i;1;¹i;2;¢¢¢ ;¹i;K)
T; Vi = (¾i;kl)K£K;7
where
¹i;k = Ei[~ rk]; ¾i;kl = Covi(~ rk; ~ rl) (2.9)
for i = 1;2;¢¢¢I and k;l = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;K.
Assume investor i has concave and strictly increasing utility of wealth function
ui(w) satisfying that µi := ¡Ei[u00
i( ~ Wi)]=Ei[u0
i( ~ Wi)] is a constant deﬁning investor
i’s global absolute risk aversion, where
~ Wi = Wi;o
Ã
1 + rf +
K X
j=1
wij(~ rj ¡ rf)
!
is the portfolio wealth of agent i, Wi;o is the initial wealth of agent i, and wij is the
fraction of wealth that agent i invests in the risky asset j.
The consensus belief can be deﬁned similarly. The following Proposition 2.3 ob-
tained in Chiarella, Dieci and He (2006b) shows that the market equilibrium returns
of the risky assets can be characterized similarly by a CAPM-like relation under a
consensus belief
Proposition 2.3. Let £ = [1
I
PI
i=1(1=µi)]¡1 and ~ rm := rf+wT
m(~ r¡rf1) be the return




























Then, in equilibrium, the asset return satisﬁes
Ea[~ r] ¡ rf1 = ¯[Ea(~ rm) ¡ rf] (2.12)
and the market risk premium is given by







¯ = (¯1;¯2;¢¢¢ ;¯K)





mVawm and Vawm = [¾a;jm].
Through a different setup, the same equilibrium relation (2.8) and (2.12) are ob-
tained. In both setups of the heterogeneous beliefs, the construction of the consensus
beliefs are very similar, but the derivation of the HCAPM are different. In the payoff
setup, the HCAPM is derived through the market equilibrium price, while in return
setup the equilibrium price plays no role in deriving the HCAPM. From the follow-
ing discussion, we see that the different setup in heterogeneity has different impact
on the market equilibrium, the efﬁciency of the optimal portfolios, and the market
performance.8 HE AND SHI
3. ONE FUND THEOREM AND MEAN-VARIANCE EFFICIENCY
Inthestandardmean-varianceframeworkwithhomogeneousbeliefs, itiswellknown
that, in the presence of a risk-less asset, one fund theorem holds. This implies that the
mean-variance efﬁcient frontier is the half line connecting the risk-free asset and the
market portfolio and the optimal portfolio of investor, which is a linear combination
of the risky market portfolio and the risk-less asset, is always located on the frontier.
When beliefs are heterogeneous, we show that this one fund theorem does not hold
anymore. This is demonstrated by considering some numerical examples of market
with one risk free asset, three risky assets and two investors who have different de-
grees of heterogeneity for both setups.
3.1. The Case of Payoff Setup. We ﬁrst examine the case where the heterogeneity
is formed in terms of the asset payoffs. The analysis is based on Proposition 2.2. The
impact of single source of heterogeneity is examined ﬁrst, followed by the impact of
multiple sources of heterogeneity.
3.1.1. Effect of heterogeneous expected payoffs. To see the impact of the heteroge-
neous expected payoff, we consider the following example in which two investors have
different beliefs but homogeneous beliefs in covariance matrix of the payoffs of three
risky assets.
Example 3.1. Assume that the two investors have the same covariance matrix ­2 =
­1 = ­o and different expected payoffs y1 = yo;y2 = yo + 3 £ 1 and absolute risk
aversion (ARA) coefﬁcients (µ1;µ2) = (3;3);(4;2) and (2;4) with individual initial
wealth2 of W0;1 = W0;2 = $10, market endowment of risky assets zm = (1;1;1)T,























For each given ARAs (µ1;µ2) in Example 3.1, we can use Proposition 2.2 to con-
struct the market consensus belief, calculate the market equilibrium price, and plot the
mean-variance efﬁcient frontiers under two heterogeneous beliefs and the consensus
belief. We can also locate the optimal portfolios of the two investors under their beliefs
and the consensus beliefs. For convenience, let z¤
i (i = 1;2) be the optimal portfolios







i) be the standard deviation and the expected return of z¤
i under subjective and
consensus beliefs, respectively, and (¾a
zm;¹a
zm) the standard deviation and the expected
return of the market portfolio zm under the consensus belief. Because of y1 < y2, in-
vestor 2 is more optimistic than investor 1. Fig. 3.1 provides the efﬁcient frontiers
2The initial wealth can be easily converted to initial endowment of risky assets and risk-free asset once
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(a3) (µ1;µ2) = (2;4)
FIGURE 3.1. Mean-Varianceefﬁcientfrontiers, optimalportfoliosand
market portfolio under heterogeneous and consensus beliefs when y1 <
y2 and ­1 = ­2.10 HE AND SHI
and the optimal portfolios of the two investors under their beliefs and consensus be-
lief, and their relative position to the market portfolio for three combinations of ARA
coefﬁcients (µ1;µ2) = (3;3);(4;2) and (2;4), respectively. Based on these ﬁgures, we
observe the followings.
First, the optimal portfolios of the two investors are located on the frontiers under
their beliefs, respectively, but not on the market efﬁcient frontier under the consensus
belie. This implies that the standard one fund theorem under homogeneous belief does

































zm; i = 1;2: (3.2)
Hence, it follows from (3.2) that the optimal risky portfolios z¤
1;z¤
2 of the two investors
are not proportional to the market portfolio zm, unless the investor belief coincides
with the market belief (i.e. yi = ya). Therefore, the optimal portfolios of the two
investors are no longer located on the frontier under the consensus belief. This is
clearly illustrated in Fig 3.1 for all three combinations of the ARAs. Also, we observed




















2 relative to investor 1 is due to his/her optimistic view on the expected payoffs, but the
ratios for both investors is below the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. It is in this
sense that we say that the optimal portfolios of two investors are inefﬁcient. By com-
paring the expected returns of the optimal portfolios under subjective and consensus


















which implies that in market equilibrium the individual’s optimal portfolio becomes
more mean-variance inefﬁcient (efﬁcient) for investor who is optimistic (pessimistic).
This suggests that optimistic investor with respect to the expected payoffs is worsen
off under the market equilibrium.
Secondly, the market frontier under the consensus belief is located in between the
frontiers under the heterogeneous beliefs, with the optimistic investor’s frontier having
the highest slope. This intuitive result follows from equation (3.1). When investor 1’s
ARA is lower, it leans more towards investor 1’s frontier, see Fig. 3.1 (a2). Similarly,
when investor 2’s ARA is lower, it leans more towards 2’s frontier, see Fig. 3.1 (a2)
(although not really signiﬁcant).
Thirdly, when the market is in equilibrium, the optimal portfolios of the two in-
vestors are very close to the market frontier, in particular for the investor who domi-
nates the market. The dominance is jointly determined by optimism and risk tolerance11
of investor, as indicated by equations (3.1) and (3.2). Since y2 > y1, the belief bias
yi ¡ ya is smaller for investors 2 and therefore the optimal portfolio is closer to the
market frontier for investor 2 than for investor 1.
In terms of the relative position of the individual frontiers to the market frontier,
the optimal portfolios to the market portfolio, one can see from Fig. 3.1 that the ex-
pected asset payoffs determine the main structure of the diagram while ARAs play a
secondary role in the placement of individual optimal portfolios and change of slope
of the market’s frontier. On the one hand, the optimal portfolios are close to the market
portfolio when the optimistic (pessimistic) investor is more (less) risk averse. On the
other hand, the optimal portfolios are further away from the market portfolio when the
optimistic (pessimistic) investor is less (more) risk averse.
3.1.2. Effect of heterogeneous variance/covariance matrices. To see the impact of
the heterogeneous covariance matrices, we consider the following example in which
two investors have heterogeneous beliefs in the covariance matrices but homogeneous
belief in the expected payoffs of the three risky assets.
Example 3.2. Let y1 = y2 = yo and ­1 = ­o and yo and ­o are given in Example
3.1. Let ­2 = ­1 ¡ 0:3 £ 1, where 1 is a 3 £ 3 matrix with all elements are equal
to 1. Then ­1 ¡ ­2 = 0:3 £ 1 is semi-positive deﬁnite. For convenience, we denote
­1 ¸ ­2 if ­1 ¡ ­2 is semi-positive deﬁnite.
As in the previous case, ﬁrst the standard one fund theorem does not held when
investors are heterogeneous and the optimal portfolios z¤
i of the investors are not on
the market frontier under the consensus belief. This is illustrated in Fig 3.2 for three




































i ­azm; i = 1;2: (3.4)
Hence the optimal risky portfolios z¤
1;z¤
2 of the two investors are not proportional to
the market portfolio zm, unless the investor belief in the covariance matrix is same as
the covariance matrix under the consensus belief (i.e. ­i = ­a).


















Note that, under the condition ­1 ¡ ­2 is semi-positive deﬁnite, the variances ¾2
p;i of
any portfolio p corresponding to ­i satisfy ¾2
p;1 ¸ ¾2
p;2. If we interpret this portfolio
variance as a measure of conﬁdence of investor about the expected payoffs, then in-
vestor 2 is more conﬁdent and the most features related to optimistic investor 2 in the
previous case still hold. In other words, when the market is in equilibrium, the Sharpe
ratio is higher for investor 2 than investor 1 but the mean-variance efﬁciency is worse
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(b3) (µ1;µ2) = (2;4)
FIGURE 3.2. Mean-Varianceefﬁcientfrontiers, optimalportfoliosand
market portfolio under heterogeneous and consensus beliefs when y1 =
y2 and ­2 < ­1.13
leaning more towards investor 2’s frontier. Overall, we see that heterogeneity in co-
variance matrices has less effect on the structure of the portfolio frontiers comparing
to the expected payoffs in the previous case in the sense that the individual frontiers
are not so apart from the market’s comparing to the previous section. Nevertheless, the
main structure of the diagram is still determined by the covariance matrices of individ-
uals while the ARAs determine the relative positions of individuals’ optimal portfolios
to the market portfolio in equilibrium
3.1.3. Effect of heterogeneous expected payoffs and covariance matrices. In the next
example, we combine Examples 3.1 and 3.2 together and examine the joint effect of
the heterogeneity in the expected payoffs and the covariance matrices.
First, we consider the situation where investor 2 is optimistic and conﬁdent in the
sense that y2 > y1 and ­2 < ­1. Fig. A.1 in Appendix illustrates this situation for
three combinations of ARAs (µ1;µ2) = (3;3), (4, 2) and (2, 4), respectively. Surpris-
ingly, apart from those observations obtained in the previous two cases, the market’s
frontier is no longer located in between but below both individual frontier. Investor
2’s frontier has the highest slope in Fig. A.1 (c1) and (c3) while investor 1 has the
highest slope in (c2). Both investors optimal portfolios’ positions under the consensus
belief are very different to those under their own subjective beliefs, while investor 1’s



















This suggests that the optimal portfolio for the conﬁdent investor (investor 2) becomes
inefﬁcient in market equilibrium, though it is very closer to the market frontier.
Next, we consider the situation where investor 2 is optimistic but less conﬁdent in
the sense that y2 > y1 and ­2 > ­1. Fig. A.2 in Appendix illustrates this situation.
Now amazingly, different from the previous case, market frontier regains its position
between the individual frontiers, while investor 2’s frontier has the highest slope, much
like the case where we have only one source of heterogeneity considered in the pre-
vious cases. Also, individuals’ optimal portfolios appear to almost lie on the market’s
frontier. However, by zooming the plot in Fig. A.2 (d3), we observe from Fig. A.2
(d4) that investors’ optimal portfolios are still below the market frontier, though they


















Hence there is no mean-variance dominance for the optimal portfolios under the sub-
jective and consensus beliefs.
In both cases, the one fund theorem does not hold and the optimal portfolios of the
investors are not located on the market frontier. When an investor is optimistic and
more conﬁdent, the market frontier can be below the individual frontiers, in particular
when the optimistic investor is less risk averse. In this case, the market risk premium is
lower and the optimal portfolio under the market belief is closer to the market frontier
fortheoptimisticandmoreconﬁdentinvestor, butfarbelowforthepessimisticandless14 HE AND SHI
conﬁdent investor. Therefore, the heterogeneity in covariance plays a very important
role in determining the slope of the market frontier. This is because the aggregate
return depends on not only the heterogeneous expected payoffs but also the covariance
matrices.
Based on the above discussions, the effect of heterogeneity in asset payoffs can
be summarized as follows. The standard one fund theorem under homogeneous belief
does not hold under heterogeneous beliefs and the optimal portfolios are located below
themarketfrontier. Theheterogeneityinthecovariancematricesplaysthemostimpor-
tant role in determining the relative positions of the individual frontiers to the market
frontier, while the heterogeneity in expected payoffs plays the second important role.
In most cases, the market frontier is located in between the individual frontiers and the
optimal portfolios under the market belief are close to the market frontier. However,
the market frontier can be below the individual frontiers when one investor is opti-
mistic and more conﬁdent and the optimal portfolios of pessimistic and less conﬁdent
investor can be far below the market frontier. The risk aversion coefﬁcients determine
the relative positions of the individuals’ optimal portfolios to the market portfolio. The
optimal portfolios are close to the market portfolio when the optimistic (pessimistic)
investor is more (less) risk averse and they are further away from the market portfolio
when the optimistic (pessimistic) investor is less (more) risk averse.
3.2. The Case of Return Setup. We now examine the case where the heterogeneity
is formed in terms of returns of the risky assets. The analysis is based on Proposition
2.3. Similarly, the impact of single source of heterogeneity is examined ﬁrst, followed
by the impact of multiple sources of heterogeneity.
3.2.1. Effect of heterogeneous expected returns. To see the impact of the heteroge-
neous expected returns, we consider the following example in which two investors
have different beliefs in the expected returns of the three risky assets.
Example 3.3. Assume the investors have the same variance/covariance matrix V2 =
V1 = Vo and different expected returns ¹1 = ¹o, ¹2 = ¹1 +0:2£1 and absolute risk
















We also assume the initial market wealth is evenly distributed between the two in-
vestors W1;o = W2;o = $10 and there is one share available for each risky asset.
In this case, we can use Proposition 2.3 to construct the market consensus belief,
to calculate the market equilibrium returns, and to plot the mean-variance efﬁcient
frontiers under two heterogeneous beliefs and the market belief, respectively. We can
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FIGURE 3.3. Mean-Varianceefﬁcientfrontiers, optimalportfoliosand
market portfolio under heterogeneous and consensus beliefs for ¹1 <
¹2 and V1 = V2 (left panel) and their close-ups (right panel).16 HE AND SHI
beliefs. For ¹1 < ¹2 in Example 3.3, Fig. 3.3 provides the mean-standard deviation
relationships for two heterogeneous beliefs and the market consensus belief based on
all these information for three combinations of risk aversion coefﬁcients (µ1;µ2) =
(3;3);(4;2) and (2;4), respectively. Based on these ﬁgures, we ﬁnd similar effect of
heterogeneity on the mean-variance frontiers to the payoff setup.
First, the standard one fund theorem does not hold in general and the optimal port-
folios of the investors are below the market frontier. In equilibrium, the optimal port-
folios of both investors are very close to the market efﬁcient frontier, but not quite on
it. In fact, they are too close to visualize the differences, even from the close-ups on
the right panels and we call this phenomena as quasi-one fund theorem. However,
numerically it can be veriﬁed that individual portfolios are below the market frontier.
For example, in Fig 3.3 (a2), for investor 1, his portfolio has co-ordinates (¾o1;¹o1) =
(0:0804;0:398), the portfolio on the frontier with the same standard deviation has co-
ordinates (0:0804;0:402), about 40 basis points (bp) difference in the expected re-
turn. Similarly for investor 2, the co-ordinates for his optimal portfolio and the one on
the frontier with same standard deviation are (0:2494;1:1414) and (0:2494;1:1427),
only 13 bp difference. Also the portfolio weights are signiﬁcantly different, for ex-





¢T while the efﬁcient frontier portfolio with the
same standard deviation has weights
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Although the differences are small, but signiﬁcant enough to rule out the one fund
theorem.
Secondly, the market frontier under the consensus belief is located in between the
individual frontiers, with the optimistic investor’s frontier having the highest slope.
This results is very intuitive since the covariance matrix of the consensus belief is
the same as the homogeneous covariance matrix and the expected returns under the
consensus belief is just a weighted average of the subjective expected returns of the
two investors. When investor 1’s ARA is lower, it leans more towards investor 1’s
frontier, see Fig. 3.3 (a3). Similarly, when investor 2’s ARA is lower, it leans more
towards 2’s frontier, see Fig. 3.3 (a2).
Thirdly, comparing to the optimal portfolios under the subjective beliefs, the indi-
vidual’s optimal portfolio under the market equilibrium becomes more mean-variance
inefﬁcient (efﬁcient) for investor who is optimistic (pessimistic). In fact, the standard
deviations of individual’s optimal portfolios are unchanged in this example, but the ex-
pected return of the optimal portfolio in market equilibrium is lower for investor 2 and
higher for investor 1, comparing to that under their subjective beliefs. This implies
that optimistic (pessimistic) investor with respect to the expected returns is worsen
(better) off under the market equilibrium. Also, the market portfolio is always located
in the middle of the optimal portfolios under the consensus belief. The distance be-
tween each optimal portfolio and market portfolio is the largest (smallest) when the17
optimistic (pessimistic) investor in terms of expected returns is less risk averse, see
Fig 3.3 (a1) and (a3).
3.2.2. Effect of heterogeneous variance/covariance matrices. To see the impact of the
heterogeneous covariance matrices, we consider in the next example that two investors
have different beliefs in the covariance matrices of the returns of the three risky assets.
Example 3.4. Let ¹2 = ¹1 = ¹o, ARA coefﬁcients and V are identical to their
numerical value in Example 3.3, V2 = V1¡0:313, where 13 is a 3£3 unit matrix with
all elements equal to 1. Hence V1 ¡ V2 is semi-positive deﬁnite and hence V2 · V1
according to the notation we introduced in the previous subsection.
As in the previous case, the standard one fund theorem under homogeneous belief
does not hold and the quasi-one fund theorem holds in this case. These features are
illustrated in Fig. 3.4 for three combinations of the risk aversion coefﬁcients. If we
interpret the covariance matrix as a measure of conﬁdence, then the observations in
the previous case still hold. Namely, the market frontier under the consensus belief is
located in between the individual frontiers and the market portfolio is still located in
the middle of the optimal portfolios. Because of ¹1 = ¹2, the expected returns of the
individual’s optimal portfolio under both individual and market beliefs are the same.
Correspondingly, one can see from Fig. 3.4 that the variance increases (decreases) for
investor 2 (investor 1). Hence, comparing to the optimal portfolios under the subjective
beliefs, the market aggregation improves (worsens) the mean-variance efﬁciency of the
optimal portfolio for the less (more) conﬁdent investor.
Overall, we see that heterogeneity in covariance matrices has considerable effect
on the structure of the portfolio frontiers. Similar to the previous example, the main
structure of the diagram is determined by the covariance matrices of individuals while
the ARAs determine the positions of individuals’ optimal portfolios under both their
own beliefs and the consensus belief.
3.2.3. Effect of heterogeneous expected returns and covariance matrices. We now
combine Examples 3.3 and 3.4 together and examine the joint effect of the hetero-
geneity in the expected returns and the covariance matrices. Consider two cases: (i)
investor 2 is optimistic and more conﬁdent in the sense that ¹2 > ¹1 and V2 < V1, and
(ii) investor 2 is optimistic but less conﬁdent in the sense that ¹2 > ¹1 and V2 > V1.
Figs A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix illustrate both situations for three combinations of
the risk aversion coefﬁcients (µ1;µ2) = (3;3), (4, 2) and (2, 4). The features in the
previous two cases are still present and the combined heterogeneity in both expected
returns and covariance matrices have even more signiﬁcant effect on the structure of
the portfolio frontiers in the sense that the individual frontiers are much apart com-
pared to the previous two cases. However, comparing Figs A.3 and A.4, one can see
that there is one signiﬁcant difference between these two cases. In the ﬁrst case the
optimal frontier of investor 2 has the highest slop, while in the second case the optimal
frontier of investor 2 has the lowest slop. Also, in the market equilibrium, comparing
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FIGURE 3.4. Mean-Varianceefﬁcientfrontiers, optimalportfoliosand
market portfolio under heterogeneous and consensus beliefs for ¹1 =
¹2 and V2 · V1.19
frontier when the frontier under his/her subjective belief has the highest (lowest) slope
amongst all three frontiers, see Figs A.3 and A.4. This means that, for the investor who
is more optimistic and conﬁdent, his/her optimal portfolio will be more closer to the
market frontier under the consensus belief. One signiﬁcant difference of return setup
from the payoff setup is that the market frontier is always in the middle of the two
individual frontiers.
Based on the above discussions, the effect of the heterogeneity in the asset returns
is very similar to the in the asset payoff considered in the previous subsection. (i) The
standard one fund theorem under homogeneous belief does not hold under heteroge-
neousbeliefs. Theoptimalportfoliosofinvestorsarenotlocatedonthemarketfrontier.
However, they are very close to the market frontier and hence quasi-one fund theorem
holds under heterogeneous beliefs. If we interpret bounded rationality as heteroge-
neous agents making optimal decisions under their subjective beliefs, then bounded
rationality leads to an almost perfectly rational market in the sense of the quasi-one
fund theorem. (ii) Different aspects of heterogeneity affect the market differently. The
heterogeneity in covariance plays the most important role in determining the relative
positions of the individual and market frontiers. This follows from comparing Figs
3.4-A.4. The heterogeneity in the expected returns plays the second important role in
determining the relative positions of the frontiers. This follows from comparing Figs
3.3, A.3 and A.4. The risk aversion coefﬁcients determine the closeness of the individ-
uals’ optimal portfolios to the market portfolio. The differences among the expected
returns of the market portfolio and the individual optimal portfolios can be signiﬁcant
when the optimistic investor is less risk averse. In addition, within all the combinations
of different aspects of heterogeneity considered, the market always generates market
risk premium between the risk premia of the individual optimal portfolios since the
market portfolio is always located in between the individual optimal portfolios.
4. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE AGGREGATE MARKET BEHAVIOUR
This section presents a statistical analysis on the market impact of the heterogeneity
among investors of two groups within the heterogeneous CAPM framework for both
payoff and return setups. Empirically, it is a challenge to measure the degree of het-
erogeneity and its uncertainty among the investors. To overcome this challenge, we
assume that the beliefs within each group can be characterized by certain probability
distributions. We assign different distributions to the beliefs of two investors from two
different groups. By simulating different aspect of heterogeneity, we conduct statis-
tical analysis through Monte Carlo simulations. The impact of the heterogeneity on
the market behaviour is then examined through the statistics of market equilibrium re-
turn distributions, the beta coefﬁcients, and two performance measures—Sharpe and
Treynor ratios. Similar to the previous section, the analysis is conducted for two dif-
ferent setups.20 HE AND SHI
4.1. The Case of Payoff Setup. We assume that there are two investors, one risk-free
asset and three risky assets in the market. We assume that investors form their beliefs
in terms of asset payoffs. We take µo = 3, the expected payoff yo and the covari-
ance matrix ­o deﬁned in Example 3.1 as the benchmark of homogeneous belief case
and the heterogeneity is measured by the dispersion from this benchmark. The initial
wealth of individuals are W1;o = W2;o = $10. There is one share available for each
asset and the risk-free rate is rf = 5% p.a. Under this setup, we arrive a set of equilib-
rium prices po = (4:8323;7:3614;5:7237)T for the benchmark case. Correspondingly,
we obtain the expected returns vector Ea(~ r) = (0:36375;0:2688;0:7087)T, asset betas
¯ = (0:9098;0:6345;1:9101)T, and the market expected return Ea(rm) = 0:3948 for
the benchmark case.
4.1.1. Impact of heterogeneous ARA’s. First, we assume that, within each group, the
investors are homogeneous except in their risk aversions, represented by their absolute
risk aversion coefﬁcients (ARA). Within each group, we assume investor’s ARAs are
normally distributed, with a mean 3 and standard deviation as a percentage of µo, i.e.
µi » N(µo;µo £ ¾µi), we call such distribution as a mean-preserved spread (MPS) in
µi for group i. The diversity in the beliefs between two groups is measured by the
change of ¾µi. We need to truncate the distribution so the ARAs are strictly positive.
By changing ¾µi, we examine the impact on the expected returns of the risky assets,
individual optimal portfolios and market portfolio. Impact on asset betas and optimal
portfolios’ betas are also looked at. The statistic result based on 10,000 simulations is
presented in Table 1 in the Appendix, from which we have the following observations.
In our tables, we denote the three risky assets, optimal portfolio for investor from
group 1 and 2, and the market portfolio by A, B, C, O1, O2 and M respectively. the
heterogeneity is measure by the difference between ¾µi.
First, the heterogeneity in ARAs generates non-normal distributions for the asset
expected return, portfolio expected return and the beta coefﬁcients for the risky as-
sets and optimal portfolios, as indicated by the JB test (JB-PV)
3, negative skewness
(Skew) and positive excess kurtosis (ExKurt). In addition, the standard deviation (SD)
increases systematically as ¾µi increases. Secondly, the MPS in ARAs reduces ex-
pected return for all risky asset, including the market portfolio and individual optimal
portfolios, and the betas, leading to a decrease in Sharpe (SR) and Treynor (TR) ratios.
Both the optimal portfolios perform similarly in terms of their betas and all the four
moments under all scenarios. In particular, the optimal portfolios of the two investors
achieve the same Sharpe and Treynor ratios as the market portfolio under all scenarios.
We now give an explanation to the above observations. First of all, because in-
vestors are homogeneous in the mean and covariance matrix of the asset payoffs, the
market belief is the same as the investors’ belief ya = yi;­a = ­i for i = 1;2.
Hence the standard one fund theorem under homogeneous belief still holds. There-
fore, the optimal portfolios of the investors perform equally to the market portfolio.
3We draw conclusions from the Jarque-Bera test of normality at 1% signiﬁcance level since we run
10,000 simulations, i.e. we reject the null hypothesis only if (JB ¡ PV ) < 0:0121
This explains the equal Sharpe and Treynor ratios of the optimal portfolios of the in-
vestors and the market portfolio under all scenarios. Secondly, Chiarella, Dieci and
He (2006a) showed that the aggregate market equilibrium price is a weighted average
of each agent’s equilibrium price under his/her belief as if he/she was the only agent
in the market. More precisely, if we deﬁne pi;o as the equilibrium price vector of the
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: (4.1)
When investors are homogeneous except ARAs, a lower µi leads to a higher price pi;o.
It then follows from equation (4.1) that the market equilibrium price is then dominated
by the investor who is less risk averse, leading to higher market equilibrium prices and
hence lower equilibrium returns. When ¾µi increases, the dominance of the less risk
averse investors becomes signiﬁcant, reducing the averages of the expected returns of
the risky assets as well as portfolios. At the meantime, because of the convexity of 1=µi
in equation (4.1), a MPS in ARAs leads to right skewed distributions for the market
equilibrium prices and hence left skewed distributions for returns, leading to negative
skewness for both returns and betas. In addition, the spread of the market equilibrium
prices when ¾µi is large leads to more spread in distributions, resulting in high standard
deviations. This analysis suggests that the heterogeneity in risk aversion coefﬁcients
is responsible for the non-normality in the market.
4.1.2. Impact of heterogeneous beliefs in expected asset payoffs. We now assume that
investors are homogeneous except in the expected payoffs. The ARAs and covariance
matrices are the same as in the benchmark homogeneous case. Within each group, we
consider a MPS in agents’ belief of expected asset payoffs. More precisely, let
yi » yo[1 + ¾±iN(0;1)]; i = 1;2:
This means that, within each group, investors beliefs in the expected asset payoffs are
independently normally distributed with volatility expressed as a percentage of the ex-
pected payoff, which is constant across all assets. The diversity of the beliefs between
two groups is measured by the change of ¾±i. We need to truncate the distribution to
ensure that the expected payoff is strictly positive. The resulting statistics based on
10,000 simulations are reported in Tab. 2 in the Appendix, from which we obtain the
following observations that are very different from the previous case. (i) The average
of the expected returns of all the risky assets and portfolios and the beta coefﬁcients do
not change much when ¾±i changes. Also, the market expected returns has zero volatil-
ity and the volatilities associated with individual assets are very small, which means22 HE AND SHI
MPS in expected payoffs does not affect the market return. In addition, the JB tests
indicate that the expected returns of the risky assets and optimal portfolios and the beta
coefﬁcients are normally distributed under many scenarios. (ii) The Treynor ratios do
not change at all. The Sharpe ratios are the same in all scenarios except for the optimal
portfolios of investors, which decreases systematically as ¾±i increases. In addition,
both the optimal portfolios have approximately the same Sharpe ratios, which are be-
low the Sharpe ratio for the market portfolio, indicating that heterogeneity in expected
payoffs are the potential causes for investors under-performing the market.












market aggregate expected payoffs ya and hence the equilibrium price. Therefore the
average of the expected returns for all the risky assets and portfolios does not change
when ¾±i changes. The small standard deviations for the risky asset returns and betas
lead to the same Treynor and Sharpe ratios under all scenarios. The under-performance
of the optimal portfolios of the investors comparing to the market portfolio is due to
their biased expected payoffs from the market, either optimistic or pessimistic to the
market belief. Overall, the heterogeneity in the expected payoffs has no signiﬁcant
effect on the market. It does not change the systematic and unsystematic risks of the
risky assets. However the unsystematic risk for the optimal portfolios of the investors
increases as ¾±i increases and this is due to their bias towards the expected payoffs.
4.1.3. Impact of heterogeneous beliefs in covariance matrices of the asset payoffs. We
now assume that investors are homogeneous except in the covariance matrices of the
asset payoffs. We decompose the covariance matrix ­o to ­o = DoCDo, where Do is
a diagonal matrix consisting of the standard deviations of the asset payoffs and C is the
correlation matrix. Within each group of investors, a MPS to the covariance matrices
is introduced as follows. Let
­i = DiCDi; Di = Do £ (²i + 1)I; ²i
iid » N(0;¾²i); i = 1;2;
where Do = diag(¾o1;¾o2;¾o3), ¾oj is the volatility of asset j’s return under the ho-
mogeneous belief and ¾ij = ¾oj(1 + ²i)
iid » N(¾oj;¾2
²i¾2
oj). Then E(Di) = Do and
E(­i) = ­o. We need to truncate the distribution to ensure that the standard devi-
ations are strictly positive. The resulting statistics based on 10,000 simulations are
reported in Tab. 3 in the Appendix, from which we observe a similar effect to the
previous case for the heterogeneous beliefs in the expected payoffs.











Therefore, on average ­a and hence the equilibrium prices are unchanged. Because of
the convex relationship (4.2), the distributions of the expected returns of the risky as-
sets and portfolios are skewed to the left. Overall, based on the statistics in Tab. 3, the
heterogeneity in the covariance matrices has no signiﬁcant impact on the market equi-
librium returns, Sharpe and Treynor ratios, and normality of the distributions for the
expected returns and beta coefﬁcients. The optimal portfolios perform approximately
equally to the market portfolio. However, when investor 2 is much more diverse in
his/her belief in volatility of asset payoff compare with investor 1, the diversity can
make the return distribution for the optimal portfolio of investor 2 to have extremely
large kurtosis and negative skewness. This suggests that investor 2 may be subjected
to potential huge losses. We notice similar effects when we consider heterogeneity in
ARA in Tab. 1, in that case, the effects were even more signiﬁcant.
4.1.4. Impact of two or three sources of heterogeneity. In the previous discussion, we
consider the impact of only one source of the heterogeneity. We found that the het-
erogeneity in the risk aversion coefﬁcients has signiﬁcant impact on the market. It can
generate non-normality of the expected returns and betas and havs signiﬁcant impact
on both systematic and unsystematic risks, measured by the changes in the Sharpe
and Treynor ratios. Also, the heterogeneity in the expected payoffs and variances do
not have much inpact on the overall market. In Tabs 4 to 6, we consider the impact
of more than one source of heterogeneity. Overall it carries on from the impact of
the single source of heterogeneity. When the heterogeneity in ARAs is involved, the
market is dominated by the heterogeneity in ARAs. In the case of heterogeneity in
both expected payoffs and the covariance matrices, there is no signiﬁcant impact on
the market, although the impact of the heterogeneous beliefs in the expected payoffs
dominates.
4.2. The case of return setup. Similar to the previous subsection, we assume that
there are two investors from two different group, one risk-free asset and three risky
assets in the market. For the benchmark case, µ1 = µ2 = µo = 3, the expected return
¹o and the return covariance matrix Vo are deﬁned in Example 3.3. For this benchmark
case, we obtain identical equilibrium prices, expected returns and betas as in the payoff
setup.
4.2.1. Impact of heterogeneity in expected asset returns. We ﬁrst examine the impact
of the heterogeneity in the expected returns. Assume two investors are homogeneous
except in expected returns. Let µ1 = µ2 = µo = 3 and V1 = V2 = Vo. Assume that the
expected returns of the two investors are normally distributed
4,
~ ¹i = ¹o + ~ ±i; ~ ±i;j
iid » ¾±iN(0;1); i = 1;2;j = 1;2;3:
4This means that, within each group, investors’ beliefs of each asset’s expected rate of return are inde-
pendently normally distributed with the same standard deviation, also we assume investors forms their
belief independently, i.e. investor 1’s belief does not affect investor 2’s belief.24 HE AND SHI
For each given (¾±1;¾±2), we run 10,000 simulations with the expected returns of the
risky assets that are normal distributions with the given standard deviations. We denote
the three risky assets, the market portfolio, the optimal portfolios of investor 1 and 2 by
A;B;C;M;O1 and O2, respectively. For (¾±1;¾±2) = (1%;1%);(1%;2%);(1%;3%),
(0;2%) and (0;3%), the summary statistics for both returns and beta coefﬁcients are
given in Tab. 7 in the Appendix. The heterogeneity of the two investors is measured
by the dispersion between ¾±1 and ¾±2. Based on this table, we have the following
observations.
The mean of expected returns of M and O2 increases as the dispersion in belief of
the expected returns of investor 2 increases. For ﬁxed ¾±1 = 1%, as ¾±2 increases by
1%, the mean of A;B and C’s expected return stays constant, while the means for
both M and O2 increase systematically, in particular for O2. Comparing the cases of
(¾±1;¾±2) = (1%;2%) and (0;3%), the later generates higher expected returns for M
and O2, about 5 basis points (bp) for M and 10bp for O2.
The standard deviations (SD) increase systematically as the belief of the expected
returns is more dispersed for all assets and portfolios, especially for O2 where the
increase in the average expected return is the largest. Clearly, high dispersion in beliefs
causes one’s optimal portfolio to have higher volatility, typically the investor who is
more dispersed in his/her beliefs. The skewness (Skew) and excess kurtosis (ExKurt)
for individual asset returns are close to zero, while they are signiﬁcantly positive for
the portfolios when dispersion is large. When the dispersion increases, the skewness
increase systematically for M and O2 but decrease for O1 when investor 1 reduces
his/her dispersion in expected returns to zero. The JB tests show that the returns of all
three risky assets A;B and C are likely to be normally distributed, while the returns
are non-normal for M and O2, especially when dispersion in expected returns is large.
Returns of O1 is likely to be normally distributed when investor does not vary belief at
all.
Both Sharpe and Treyor ratios increase systematically for all portfolios. The Sharpe
ratios for M and O2 are higher for larger difference in (¾±1;¾±2). Also M has the
highest Sharpe ratio follow by O1 and O2, while asset B has the lowest Sharpe ratio.
Applying the HCAPM, the Treynor ratios are the same for given (¾±1;¾±2) across all
the assets and portfolios. However, the Treynor ratio increases for more dispersed
beliefs in (¾±1;¾±2). The improvement of both Sharpe and Treyor ratios due to the
high dispersion in beliefs is not observed for the payoff setup. This suggests that,
measured by Sharpe and Treyor ratios, investors and market are beneﬁt from investor
diversity in their belief.
Noting that assets A and B have betas less than 1 while C has a beta coefﬁcient
larger 1, and portfolios O1 and O2 have betas close to 1. The mean value for the
beta coefﬁcients decreases systematically, this suggests that greater dispersion beliefs
causes the beta coefﬁcients to decrease. The standard deviationfor the beta coefﬁcients
increases systematically as the belief of the expected returns is more dispersed. Skew-
ness increases for high beta stock C (¯ > 1) and decreases for low beta stocks A and25
B (¯ < 1). The J-B test shows the beta of all assets and portfolios are are likely to be
normally distributed except for stock B, when dispersion in beliefs is large.
4.2.2. Impact of heterogeneity in covariance matrices. Different from the previous
case, we now assume that the investors are homogeneous except in the covariance ma-
trices in asset returns. Let µ1 = µ2 = µo = 3 and ¹1 = ¹2 = ¹o. Assume investors’
beliefs of the correlation structure of the asset returns are homogenous and ﬁxed, how-
ever the beliefs of standard deviations of asset returns are independently normally dis-
tributed for each investor, that is, Vo = DoCDo where Do = diag(¾o1;¾o2;¾o3) and C
is the correlation matrix and ~ Vi = ~ DiC ~ Di where ~ Di = Do + ²iI and ²i
iid » N(0;¾2
²i).
Hence the standard deviation of asset j’s return under investor i’s belief is the random
variable ~ ¾ij » N(¾oj;¾2
²i), which is independent for each asset j and investor i. By
conducting the same Monte Carlo simulations, we summarize the resulting statistics
in Tab. 8 in the Appendix.
Similar to the previous case, we measure the heterogeneoty or diversity by the dis-
persion in (¾²1;¾²2) of the covariance matrices. Large ¾²2 or difference between ¾²1
and ¾²2 correspond to more dispersed or diversiﬁed beliefs in covariance matrices.
Based on Tab. 8, we have the following observations. (i) The expected return of the
risky assets are unchanged, but the Sharpe and Treynor ratios increase systematically
when the beliefs in covariance matrices are more dispersed. (ii) The four moments,
including the mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis, of the expected returns
for M and O2 increase systematically when the beliefs in covariance matrices are more
dispersed, whilethatforO1 isunchanged. Inparticular, bothM andO2 haveextremely
high skewness and kurtosis when (¾²1;¾²2) = (1%;3%) and (¾²1;¾²2) = (0%;3%). It
seems that when the dispersion of variance-covariance of returns is too large, the return
distributions of the portfolios do not have ﬁnite moment except for the ﬁrst moment.
Also, the JB tests indicate that the expected return of M and O2 follow non-normal
distributions. (iii) For the beta coefﬁcients of the risky assets and the optimal portfo-
lios, the Mean and Skew decrease while the SD and ExKurt increase systematically
when the beliefs in covariance matrices are more dispersed. Also, the JB test indicates
that the beta coefﬁcients follow non-normal distributions.
4.2.3. The impact of heterogeneous ARA coefﬁcients. In the homogeneous case when
Vi = Vo and ¹i = ¹o for all i, it is clear from Proposition 2.3 that any changes in the
ARA coefﬁcient will not affect the market consensus belief Ba and standard CAPM
holds. However, this is no longer the case when either the beliefs of expected returns
or variance/covariance of returns are heterogeneous. In this subsection, we consider
three cases to assess the impact of heterogeneous ARA coefﬁcients, case(i): ¹1 6= ¹2,
Vo = V1 = V2, case (ii):¹o = ¹1 = ¹2, V1 6= V2, and case (iii):¹1 6= ¹2, V1 6= V2.
For case (i), consider our example in subsection 4.2.1 and let ¾±i = 1% and µi »
N(3;¾µi) for i = 1;2. We run 10,000 simulations for different combinations of
(¾µ1;¾µ2) and base our discussion on the summary statistics in Tab. 9 in the Appendix.26 HE AND SHI
The impact on the ﬁrst two moments of the expected returns under the market con-
sensus belief is minimal, only M and O2 have an increasing trend in their mean and
standard deviation of expected returns. Dispersion in ARA coefﬁcients have positive
effects on the skewness and kurtosis of the portfolios, which is strongest for O2, follow
by M. This is expected since investor 2 has a larger dispersion in ARA than investor1,
meaning that investor 2 has a higher chance of achieving large positive expected return
for his/her portfolio. Distribution of the expected returns of the portfolios are non-
normal while the distributions are likely to be normal for the risky assets under most
scenarios, which is similar to the case in subsection 4.2.1. This suggests that dispersion
in ARA has little or no effect on the distribution of individual asset expected returns.
The Sharpe ratios appears to be constant under all scenarios, however, the Treynor ra-
tios seem to be increasing systematically.The mean of beta coefﬁcients is decreasing
for all except O2 and standard deviation is increasing for all. This, together with the
performance of the Treynor ratios, indicates that the dispersion in ARA reduces the
systematic risk of the portfolios. JB tests show distributions for beta are likely to be
normal for small dispersion in ARA.
For case (ii), consider our example in subsection 4.2.2 and let ¾²i = 1% and
µi » N(3;¾µi) for i = 1;2. We run 10,000 simulations for different combinations
of (¾µ1;¾µ2) and base our discussion on the summary statistics in Tab.10 in the Appen-
dix. The results are quite similar to the previous case, except the following differences.
The distribution of beta coefﬁcients for risky assets is more likely to be normally dis-
tributed when the dispersion in ARA is large. Also, skewness of the beta coefﬁcient
for risky asset is now systematically decreasing while the kurtosis are increasing.
For case (iii), we combine the previous two cases to see the effect of dispersion in
ARA coefﬁcients when beliefs in both expected returns and varaince/covaraince ma-
trix are heterogeneous and base our discussion on the summary statistics in Tab.11
in the Appendix. The results are somewhat similar to the previous two cases. We ob-
serve some common characteristics of impact of heterogeneous ARA coefﬁcients. The
dispersion in ARA coefﬁcients can affect the skewness and kurtosis of the portfolios’
expected returns. It improves the Treynor ratios systematically, but not Sharpe ratios.
Based on the above analysis, we obtain the following overall features on the impact
of the heterogeneity when beliefs are formed in returns. (i) The heterogeneity has
more impact on the distribution of portfolios’ expected returns than assets’ expected
returns. (ii) Diversity in beliefs leads to better performance especially for the portfolios
as well as the risky assets in terms of Sharpe and Treynor ratios. (iii) When beliefs
in expected return and/or variance/covariance of returns are heterogeneous, investors
with a large dispersion in his/her risk tolerance can create a large positive skewness and
kurtosis for the expected return of his/her portfolio and the market portfolio, which is
a more favorable outcome than a symmetric distribution. (iv) Market aggregation of
heterogeneous beliefs can lead to non-normality in return distributions of the market
portfolio as well as the individual optimal portfolios.27
5. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the impact on the market when investors are heterogeneous and
bounded rational. Within the framework of Chiarella, Dieci and He (2006a, 2006b) on
mean-variance analysis under heterogeneous beliefs in terms of either the payoffs or
returns of the risky assets, this paper analyzes the effect of the heterogeneity. Through
some numerical examples and statistical analysis based on Monte Carlo simulations,
we examine the mean-variance efﬁciency and the diversity effect of the heterogeneous
beliefs. Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. (i) For both payoff and
return setups, the standard one fund theorem under homogeneous belief does not hold
under heterogeneous beliefs and the optimal portfolios are located below the market
frontier. This may help us to understand the empirical ﬁnding that the managed funds
under-perform the index portfolio on average. However, for the return setup, the op-
timal portfolios of investors can be very close to the market frontier in equilibrium.
This implies that investors’ portfolio selections under their subjective beliefs are al-
most perfectly rational under the market’s belief, and this phenomenon is referred as
the quasi-one fund theorem. (ii) The market frontier is located in between the frontiers
of investors under their beliefs in most cases, while different aspect of heterogene-
ity plays different role. The heterogeneity in the covariance matrices plays the most
important role in determining the relative positions of the individual frontiers and the
market frontier, while the heterogeneity in expected payoffs/returns plays the second
important role, which is controlling how far apart are the individual frontiers from the
market frontier. The risk aversion coefﬁcients determine the relative positions of the
individual optimal portfolios to the market portfolio. (iii) For the payoff setup, the
diversity in heterogeneity in risk aversion coefﬁcients has signiﬁcant impact on the
market, it can generate non-normality for the expected returns and betas and both sys-
tematic and unsystematic risks, measured by the changes in the Sharpe and Treynor
ratios. However the belief dispersions in the expected payoffs and covariance matrices
of the risky assets have no signiﬁcant impact on the market. (iv) For the return setup,
heterogeneity has more impact on the distribution of portfolios’ expected returns than
assets’ expected returns. Diversity in heterogeneity leads to better performance for the
portfolios as well as the risky assets in terms of Sharpe and Treynor ratios. When
beliefs in expected return and/or variance/covariance of returns are heterogeneous,
investors with a large dispersion in his/her risk tolerance can create a large positive
skewness and kurtosis for the expected return of his/her portfolio and the market port-
folio. Also, market aggregation of heterogeneous can lead to non-normality in return
distributions.
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FIGURE A.1. Mean-Variance efﬁcient frontiers, optimal portfolios
and market portfolio under heterogeneous and consensus beliefs for
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FIGURE A.2. Mean-Variance efﬁcient frontiers, optimal portfolios
and market portfolio under heterogeneous and consensus beliefs for
y1 < y2;­1 < ­2.31
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FIGURE A.3. Mean-Variance efﬁcient frontiers, optimal portfolios
and market portfolio under heterogeneous and consensus beliefs for
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FIGURE A.4. Mean-Variance efﬁcient frontiers, optimal portfolios
and market portfolio under heterogeneous and consensus beliefs for
¹1 < ¹2;V1 < V2.33
Ea(~ r) ¯
Mean Mean
(¾µ1;¾µ2) A B C M O1 O2 A B C O1 O2
(5%;5%) 0.3638 0.2688 0.7092 0.3947 0.3945 0.3949 0.9098 0.6344 1.9107 0.9995 1.0005
(5%;10%) 0.3626 0.268 0.7069 0.3936 0.3936 0.3935 0.9091 0.6341 1.9081 0.9982 1.0018
(5%;15%) 0.3617 0.2673 0.7057 0.3925 0.3923 0.3926 0.9085 0.6337 1.9067 0.9943 1.0057
(0%;10%) 0.3629 0.2682 0.7075 0.3939 0.3938 0.394 0.9093 0.6342 1.9088 0.9973 1.0027
(0%;15%) 0.3623 0.2677 0.7069 0.393 0.3932 0.3928 0.9089 0.6339 1.9081 0.9948 1.0052
SD SD
(5%;5%) 0.0145 0.0094 0.0382 0.0123 0.0173 0.0172 0.0097 0.0047 0.0427 0.0353 0.0353
(5%;10%) 0.0229 0.0149 0.0602 0.0194 0.0344 0.0175 0.0153 0.0074 0.0673 0.0566 0.0566
(5%;15%) 0.0326 0.0212 0.0854 0.0279 0.0517 0.0174 0.0218 0.0106 0.0955 0.0805 0.0805
(0%;10%) 0.0205 0.0133 0.0536 0.0174 0.0345 0.0013 0.0136 0.0066 0.06 0.0504 0.0504
(0%;15%) 0.0307 0.0199 0.08 0.0262 0.0514 0.0031 0.0205 0.01 0.0895 0.0761 0.0761
Skew Skew
(5%;5%) 0.0876 0.0685 0.1574 0.0246 -0.0488 -0.0904 0.0876 0.0685 0.1574 0.0323 -0.0323
(5%;10%) -0.0038 -0.0345 0.1079 -0.1059 -0.138 -0.1187 -0.0038 -0.0345 0.1079 -0.1842 0.1842
(5%;15%) -0.1489 -0.1953 0.018 -0.3042 -0.2025 -0.0526 -0.1489 -0.1953 0.018 -0.3648 0.3648
(0%;10%) -0.1717 -0.1987 -0.0748 -0.2615 -0.1095 -3.4536 -0.1717 -0.1987 -0.0748 -0.2615 0.2615
(0%;15%) -0.3033 -0.3448 -0.1563 -0.4434 -0.2027 -3.9927 -0.3033 -0.3448 -0.1563 -0.4434 0.4434
ExKurt ExKurt
(5%;5%) -0.0117 -0.0182 0.0244 -0.0274 0.0356 0.0302 -0.0117 -0.0182 0.0244 0.0249 0.0249
(5%;10%) 0.0168 0.0214 0.0304 0.0459 -0.0486 0.1198 0.0168 0.0214 0.0304 0.064 0.064
(5%;15%) 0.1524 0.1808 0.1235 0.2827 -0.0339 0.0887 0.1524 0.1808 0.1235 0.1737 0.1737
(0%;10%) 0.004 0.0233 -0.0405 0.0804 -0.045 21.6489 0.004 0.0233 -0.0405 0.0804 0.0804
(0%;15%) 0.1147 0.166 -0.0114 0.3156 -0.017 27.3091 0.1147 0.166 -0.0114 0.3156 0.3156
JB-PV JB-PV
(5%;5%) 0.0016 0.0187 0 0.4843 0.106 0.0009 0.0016 0.0187 0 0.3677 0.3677
(5%;10%) 0.0679 0.3366 0 0 0 0 0.0679 0.3366 0 0 0
(5%;15%) 0 0 0.0319 0 0 0.0193 0 0 0.0319 0 0
(0%;10%) 0 0 0.0067 0 0 0 0 0 0.0067 0 0
(0%;15%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SR
(5%;5%) 1.9106 1.8357 2.5774 3.2153 3.2153 3.2153
(5%;10%) 1.9042 1.8296 2.5688 3.2045 3.2045 3.2045
(5%;15%) 1.8981 1.8237 2.5606 3.1943 3.1943 3.1943
(0%;10%) 1.9061 1.8314 2.5713 3.2076 3.2076 3.2076
(0%;15%) 1.9012 1.8267 2.5648 3.1995 3.1995 3.1995
TR
(5%;5%) 0.3447 0.3447 0.3447 0.3447 0.3447 0.3447
(5%;10%) 0.3436 0.3436 0.3436 0.3436 0.3436 0.3436
(5%;15%) 0.3425 0.3425 0.3425 0.3425 0.3425 0.3425
(0%;10%) 0.3439 0.3439 0.3439 0.3439 0.3439 0.3439
(0%;15%) 0.343 0.343 0.343 0.343 0.343 0.343
TABLE 1. Impact of risk-aversion coefﬁcients µi » N(µo;µo£¾µi) for
the payoff setup with y1 = y2 = yo and ­1 = ­2 = ­o.34 HE AND SHI
Ea(~ r) ¯
Mean Mean
(¾±1;¾±2) A B C M O1 O2 A B C O1 O2
(1%;1%) 0.3638 0.2688 0.7087 0.3948 0.3948 0.3949 0.9099 0.6345 1.9102 0.9998 1.0002
(1%;2%) 0.3638 0.2688 0.7089 0.3948 0.3948 0.3948 0.9101 0.6346 1.9107 1 1
(1%;3%) 0.3639 0.2689 0.7089 0.3948 0.3947 0.395 0.9101 0.6348 1.9108 0.9997 1.0003
(0%;2%) 0.3639 0.2688 0.7087 0.3948 0.3948 0.3949 0.9102 0.6345 1.91 0.9998 1.0002
(0%;3%) 0.3639 0.2688 0.7092 0.3948 0.3948 0.3949 0.9102 0.6345 1.9115 0.9999 1.0001
SD SD
(1%;1%) 0.0029 0.0019 0.0077 0 0.0053 0.0053 0.0084 0.0054 0.0223 0.0154 0.0154
(1%;2%) 0.0046 0.0029 0.0118 0 0.0084 0.0084 0.0133 0.0085 0.0343 0.0243 0.0243
(1%;3%) 0.0064 0.0042 0.0172 0 0.0119 0.0119 0.0186 0.0121 0.0498 0.0346 0.0346
(0%;2%) 0.0042 0.0027 0.0108 0 0.0076 0.0076 0.0121 0.0077 0.0314 0.022 0.022
(0%;3%) 0.0062 0.004 0.0163 0 0.0113 0.0113 0.018 0.0115 0.0471 0.0329 0.0329
Skew Skew
(1%;1%) 0.0549 0.0235 0.0692 n/a 0.008 -0.008 0.0549 0.0235 0.0692 0.008 -0.008
(1%;2%) 0.0996 0.0857 0.0894 n/a 0.0371 -0.0371 0.0996 0.0857 0.0894 0.0371 -0.0371
(1%;3%) 0.1148 0.0919 0.1625 n/a -0.0042 0.0042 0.1148 0.0919 0.1625 -0.0042 0.0042
(0%;2%) 0.064 0.0688 0.1087 n/a -0.002 0.002 0.064 0.0688 0.1087 -0.002 0.002
(0%;3%) 0.1058 0.1173 0.1304 n/a -0.0014 0.0014 0.1058 0.1173 0.1304 -0.0014 0.0014
ExKurt ExKurt
(1%;1%) 0.0553 -0.0456 0.0639 n/a 0.0156 0.0156 0.0553 -0.0456 0.0639 0.0156 0.0156
(1%;2%) 0.1327 -0.0403 0.0566 n/a -0.0526 -0.0526 0.1327 -0.0403 0.0566 -0.0526 -0.0526
(1%;3%) 0.0386 0.0981 0.0152 n/a -0.0024 -0.0024 0.0386 0.0981 0.0152 -0.0024 -0.0024
(0%;2%) -0.08 0.0596 0.0316 n/a 0.0104 0.0104 -0.08 0.0596 0.0316 0.0104 0.0104
(0%;3%) -0.0216 0.0687 -0.0443 n/a 0.0787 0.0787 -0.0216 0.0687 -0.0443 0.0787 0.0787
JB-PV JB-PV
(1%;1%) 0.0431 0.41 0.0079 n/a 0.0989 0.0989 0.0431 0.41 0.0079 0.0989 0.0989
(1%;2%) 0 0.0016 0.0007 n/a 0.1779 0.1779 0 0.0016 0.0007 0.1779 0.1779
(1%;3%) 0 0.0001 0 n/a 0.0157 0.0157 0 0.0001 0 0.0157 0.0157
(0%;2%) 0.0087 0.0092 0 n/a 0.0253 0.0253 0.0087 0.0092 0 0.0253 0.0253
(0%;3%) 0 0 0 n/a 0.2747 0.2747 0 0 0 0.2747 0.2747
SR
(1%;1%) 1.9113 1.8364 2.5784 3.2164 3.2149 3.2149
(1%;2%) 1.9113 1.8364 2.5784 3.2164 3.2126 3.2126
(1%;3%) 1.9113 1.8364 2.5784 3.2164 3.2089 3.209
(0%;2%) 1.9113 1.8364 2.5784 3.2164 3.2133 3.2133
(0%;3%) 1.9113 1.8364 2.5784 3.2164 3.2096 3.2096
TR
(1%;1%) 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448
(1%;2%) 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448
(1%;3%) 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448
(0%;2%) 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448
(0%;3%) 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448
TABLE 2. Impact of heterogeneous beliefs in expected asset payoffs




(¾²1;¾²2) A B C M O1 O2 A B C O1 O2
(1%;1%) 0.3636 0.2687 0.7088 0.3948 0.3948 0.3948 0.9097 0.6343 1.9107 1 1
(1%;2%) 0.3636 0.2688 0.7088 0.3948 0.3948 0.3947 0.9097 0.6346 1.9104 0.9999 1.0001
(1%;3%) 0.3635 0.2687 0.709 0.3947 0.3948 0.3945 0.9096 0.6345 1.9109 1.0001 0.9999
(0%;2%) 0.3636 0.2687 0.709 0.3948 0.3949 0.3947 0.9096 0.6344 1.9109 1.0002 0.9998
(0%;3%) 0.3636 0.2687 0.709 0.3947 0.3949 0.3945 0.9099 0.6344 1.9109 1.0002 0.9998
SD SD
(1%;1%) 0.0047 0.0032 0.0142 0.0031 0.0043 0.0044 0.0119 0.0084 0.0268 0.0089 0.0089
(1%;2%) 0.0075 0.005 0.0221 0.0048 0.0087 0.0043 0.0191 0.013 0.042 0.0142 0.0142
(1%;3%) 0.0107 0.0071 0.0315 0.0069 0.0131 0.0044 0.0271 0.0186 0.0598 0.0201 0.0201
(0%;2%) 0.0067 0.0046 0.0198 0.0044 0.0087 0.0001 0.017 0.012 0.0376 0.0126 0.0126
(0%;3%) 0.0101 0.0069 0.0297 0.0065 0.013 0.0003 0.0257 0.0181 0.0568 0.0188 0.0188
Skew Skew
(1%;1%) 0.0229 0.0806 0.0934 0.0389 0.0412 0 0.0437 0.0557 0.062 0.0101 -0.0101
(1%;2%) 0.014 -0.0182 0.1298 0.0207 0.0274 0.0031 0.0795 -0.0456 0.1019 -0.0103 0.0103
(1%;3%) 0.0097 -0.0024 0.0318 -0.0533 -0.0121 -0.0095 0.0472 0.0126 -0.0083 -0.0473 0.0473
(0%;2%) -0.0193 -0.0646 -0.0124 -0.0539 -0.01 -2.1302 -0.0113 -0.054 -0.0348 -0.0407 0.0407
(0%;3%) -0.0662 -0.0568 0.0632 0.0007 0.0666 -2.0914 -0.0138 -0.0538 0.0229 0.0174 -0.0174
ExKurt ExKurt
(1%;1%) -0.021 0.0632 0.0066 -0.0069 -0.0111 -0.0007 -0.0415 0.0529 0.0304 0.0568 0.0568
(1%;2%) 0.0241 0.0115 -0.0095 -0.0976 -0.0559 -0.0585 0.0039 0.0464 -0.0098 -0.0314 -0.0314
(1%;3%) -0.0446 0.0667 0.0214 0.0484 -0.0102 0.0498 0.0075 -0.0081 -0.0331 -0.0543 -0.0543
(0%;2%) 0.048 -0.0708 0.0092 -0.0284 -0.0425 8.1368 0.0309 -0.0279 0.0219 -0.0406 -0.0406
(0%;3%) 0.046 -0.0302 -0.0209 0.0377 0.0426 7.9146 -0.0434 -0.0263 -0.0579 0.0345 0.0345
JB-PV JB-PV
(1%;1%) 0.4109 0.0019 0.0007 0.2809 0.2378 0.0001 0.1421 0.0421 0.0335 0.4683 0.4683
(1%;2%) 0.2478 0.2626 0 0.0962 0.2788 0.4863 0.0051 0.1127 0.0002 0.2542 0.2542
(1%;3%) 0.3889 0.3938 0.3914 0.0573 0.1341 0.4466 0.154 0.1354 0.2493 0.0841 0.0841
(0%;2%) 0.4541 0.0108 0.135 0.0751 0.3689 0 0.2631 0.0749 0.3293 0.1788 0.1788
(0%;3%) 0.0168 0.0563 0.0328 0.2567 0.017 0 0.423 0.0776 0.3214 0.3939 0.3939
SR
(1%;1%) 1.911 1.836 2.5783 3.2161 3.2159 3.2159
(1%;2%) 1.9108 1.836 2.5779 3.2159 3.2154 3.2154
(1%;3%) 1.9103 1.8356 2.5776 3.2155 3.2144 3.2144
(0%;2%) 1.9109 1.8361 2.5783 3.2162 3.2158 3.2158
(0%;3%) 1.9106 1.8356 2.5778 3.2157 3.2147 3.2147
TR
(1%;1%) 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448
(1%;2%) 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448
(1%;3%) 0.3447 0.3447 0.3447 0.3447 0.3447 0.3447
(0%;2%) 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448 0.3448
(0%;3%) 0.3447 0.3447 0.3447 0.3447 0.3447 0.3447
TABLE 3. Impact of heterogeneous beliefs in variance/covariance of
asset payoffs ­i = DiCDi;Di = Do £(²i +1)I;²i
iid » N(0;¾²i);Do =
diag(¾o1;¾o2;¾o3);¾ij = ¾oj(1 + ²i)
iid » N(¾oj;¾2
²i¾2
oj) with yi = yo
and µ1 = µ2 = 3.36 HE AND SHI
Ea(~ r) ¯
Mean Mean
(¾µ1;¾µ2) A B C M O1 O2 A B C O1 O2
(5%;5%) 0.3632 0.2684 0.7079 0.3943 0.3943 0.3942 0.9095 0.6343 1.9095 1.0001 0.9999
(5%;10%) 0.363 0.2682 0.7077 0.3938 0.3937 0.394 0.9095 0.6341 1.909 0.9976 1.0024
(5%;15%) 0.362 0.2675 0.7066 0.3927 0.3927 0.3927 0.9087 0.6338 1.9081 0.9945 1.0055
(0%;10%) 0.3632 0.2685 0.7085 0.3941 0.3943 0.394 0.9095 0.6344 1.9104 0.9978 1.0022
(0%;15%) 0.3624 0.2678 0.7072 0.3931 0.3933 0.3929 0.909 0.634 1.9085 0.9946 1.0054
SD SD
(5%;5%) 0.0147 0.0096 0.0389 0.0123 0.0179 0.0181 0.0127 0.0072 0.048 0.0384 0.0384
(5%;10%) 0.0231 0.015 0.0607 0.0194 0.0352 0.0178 0.0174 0.0091 0.0708 0.059 0.059
(5%;15%) 0.0329 0.0214 0.0863 0.028 0.0524 0.018 0.0234 0.0119 0.0987 0.0827 0.0827
(0%;10%) 0.021 0.0136 0.055 0.0177 0.0355 0.0055 0.0162 0.0086 0.0647 0.0539 0.0539
(0%;15%) 0.0309 0.0201 0.0807 0.0263 0.0519 0.0062 0.0223 0.0113 0.0923 0.0779 0.0779
Skew Skew
(5%;5%) 0.0536 0.0274 0.122 -0.0326 -0.0627 -0.0383 0.1018 0.0648 0.1479 0.005 -0.005
(5%;10%) -0.0058 -0.0361 0.0961 -0.1187 -0.1522 -0.0234 0.0368 0.0226 0.1088 -0.2353 0.2353
(5%;15%) -0.1536 -0.1994 0.0087 -0.318 -0.2063 -0.0856 -0.0874 -0.0951 0.0326 -0.3904 0.3904
(0%;10%) -0.225 -0.2566 -0.1165 -0.3373 -0.1664 -0.0747 -0.0993 -0.0861 -0.061 -0.3231 0.3231
(0%;15%) -0.2727 -0.3118 -0.1287 -0.4204 -0.1799 -0.4489 -0.1963 -0.175 -0.1036 -0.4185 0.4185
ExKurt ExKurt
(5%;5%) -0.0003 0.0126 0.0277 0.0078 0.069 0.034 -0.0046 0.079 0.0248 0.0744 0.0744
(5%;10%) 0.0157 0.0095 -0.0011 0.0269 -0.008 0.0427 0.0446 0.028 -0.0059 0.0952 0.0952
(5%;15%) 0.1159 0.1689 0.0535 0.286 -0.0105 0.0342 0.072 0.1584 0.0617 0.2871 0.2871
(0%;10%) 0.1378 0.1828 0.0787 0.272 0.095 0.0732 0.091 0.0606 0.0669 0.3105 0.3105
(0%;15%) 0.091 0.1309 -0.0363 0.2921 -0.0397 1.2884 0.0558 0.0398 -0.0325 0.2803 0.2803
JB-PV JB-PV
(5%;5%) 0.0912 0.4821 0 0.4064 0.014 0.2322 0.0002 0.0082 0 0.3088 0.3088
(5%;10%) 0.0766 0.3321 0.0005 0 0 0.4338 0.2143 0.4448 0 0 0
(5%;15%) 0 0 0.4827 0 0 0.0018 0.0006 0 0.1866 0 0
(0%;10%) 0 0 0 0 0 0.0031 0 0.001 0.0178 0 0
(0%;15%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0001 0 0
SR
(5%;5%) 1.9081 1.8333 2.5741 3.2111 3.2096 3.2096
(5%;10%) 1.9056 1.8309 2.5708 3.2069 3.2054 3.2054
(5%;15%) 1.8995 1.8251 2.5625 3.1966 3.1951 3.1952
(0%;10%) 1.9074 1.8326 2.5732 3.2099 3.2084 3.2084
(0%;15%) 1.9016 1.827 2.5653 3.2001 3.1985 3.1985
TR
(5%;5%) 0.3443 0.3443 0.3443 0.3443 0.3443 0.3443
(5%;10%) 0.3438 0.3438 0.3438 0.3438 0.3438 0.3438
(5%;15%) 0.3427 0.3427 0.3427 0.3427 0.3427 0.3427
(0%;10%) 0.3441 0.3441 0.3441 0.3441 0.3441 0.3441
(0%;15%) 0.3431 0.3431 0.3431 0.3431 0.3431 0.3431
TABLE 4. Impact of risk-aversion coefﬁcients with dispersion in ex-
pected payoffs: (¾±1;¾±2) = (1%;1%).37
Ea(~ r) ¯
Mean Mean
(¾µ1;¾µ2) A B C M O1 O2 A B C O1 O2
(5%;5%) 0.3633 0.2685 0.7082 0.3943 0.3945 0.3942 0.9094 0.6343 1.9098 1.0003 0.9997
(5%;10%) 0.363 0.2683 0.7079 0.3939 0.3939 0.3938 0.9092 0.6344 1.9093 0.9982 1.0018
(5%;15%) 0.3619 0.2674 0.7061 0.3926 0.3924 0.3928 0.9087 0.6338 1.9073 0.9941 1.0059
(0%;10%) 0.3629 0.2682 0.7074 0.3939 0.3938 0.3939 0.9094 0.6342 1.9087 0.9972 1.0028
(0%;15%) 0.3618 0.2674 0.7058 0.3926 0.3924 0.3928 0.9084 0.6337 1.9072 0.9936 1.0064
SD SD
(5%;5%) 0.0152 0.0099 0.0405 0.0126 0.0177 0.0178 0.0155 0.0097 0.0502 0.0364 0.0364
(5%;10%) 0.0235 0.0153 0.0621 0.0197 0.0348 0.0177 0.0194 0.0113 0.0727 0.057 0.057
(5%;15%) 0.0331 0.0216 0.0868 0.0281 0.052 0.018 0.0249 0.0137 0.0993 0.0812 0.0812
(0%;10%) 0.0212 0.0138 0.0557 0.0178 0.035 0.0045 0.0186 0.0109 0.0658 0.0516 0.0516
(0%;15%) 0.0311 0.0202 0.0812 0.0265 0.0516 0.0055 0.0238 0.013 0.0932 0.0769 0.0769
Skew Skew
(5%;5%) 0.1003 0.0828 0.1988 0.0361 -0.0559 -0.0469 0.0837 0.0599 0.1895 0.0088 -0.0088
(5%;10%) 0.0162 -0.0179 0.1247 -0.104 -0.1398 -0.0484 0.0749 0.0448 0.1336 -0.2182 0.2182
(5%;15%) -0.1522 -0.1896 0.012 -0.3136 -0.2039 -0.0719 -0.0532 -0.0175 0.0318 -0.3801 0.3801
(0%;10%) -0.1794 -0.204 -0.0731 -0.2924 -0.154 -0.0663 -0.0413 -0.0312 -0.0294 -0.3084 0.3084
(0%;15%) -0.3252 -0.3604 -0.164 -0.4889 -0.2394 -1.0135 -0.1775 -0.0822 -0.1269 -0.4973 0.4973
ExKurt ExKurt
(5%;5%) -0.0064 0.0337 0.1477 0.0449 0.0501 0.0136 -0.0309 -0.0008 0.1358 0.0093 0.0093
(5%;10%) -0.0017 -0.0011 0.0625 0.0335 0.013 -0.0716 -0.082 0.0103 0.0636 0.1301 0.1301
(5%;15%) 0.0796 0.1013 0.0376 0.2251 -0.0115 0.118 0.022 0.0489 0.0469 0.2501 0.2501
(0%;10%) 0.03 0.0732 0.0041 0.1449 -0.0105 0.1835 -0.0161 -0.0104 0.0073 0.1471 0.1471
(0%;15%) 0.288 0.316 0.0898 0.5372 0.085 5.218 0.2859 0.0959 0.0728 0.5501 0.5501
JB-PV JB-PV
(5%;5%) 0.0002 0.0026 0 0.2222 0.044 0.1535 0.0024 0.0504 0 0.0789 0.0789
(5%;10%) 0.1966 0.2351 0 0 0 0.0489 0.0023 0.1831 0 0 0
(5%;15%) 0 0 0.3389 0 0 0.0007 0.0854 0.4707 0.2729 0 0
(0%;10%) 0 0 0.0116 0 0 0 0.228 0.4343 0.4821 0 0
(0%;15%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0005 0 0 0
SR
(5%;5%) 1.9083 1.8336 2.5747 3.2117 3.2115 3.2115
(5%;10%) 1.9059 1.8315 2.5713 3.2077 3.2074 3.2074
(5%;15%) 1.8987 1.8243 2.5615 3.1954 3.1952 3.1952
(0%;10%) 1.9059 1.8312 2.571 3.2073 3.2071 3.2071
(0%;15%) 1.8989 1.8245 2.5619 3.1959 3.1956 3.1956
TR
(5%;5%) 0.3443 0.3443 0.3443 0.3443 0.3443 0.3443
(5%;10%) 0.3439 0.3439 0.3439 0.3439 0.3439 0.3439
(5%;15%) 0.3426 0.3426 0.3426 0.3426 0.3426 0.3426
(0%;10%) 0.3439 0.3439 0.3439 0.3439 0.3439 0.3439
(0%;15%) 0.3426 0.3426 0.3426 0.3426 0.3426 0.3426
TABLE 5. Impact of risk-aversion coefﬁcients with dispersion in co-
variance matrices of asset payoffs: (¾²1;¾²2) = (1%;1%).38 HE AND SHI
Ea(~ r) ¯
Mean Mean
(¾µ1;¾µ2) A B C M O1 O2 A B C O1 O2
(5%;5%) 0.3636 0.2687 0.7087 0.3945 0.3946 0.3945 0.9099 0.6346 1.91 1.0001 0.9999
(5%;10%) 0.3626 0.268 0.7069 0.3935 0.3936 0.3935 0.909 0.6343 1.908 0.9981 1.0019
(5%;15%) 0.3622 0.2678 0.7072 0.3929 0.3931 0.3927 0.9088 0.6342 1.9086 0.9954 1.0046
(0%;10%) 0.3632 0.2684 0.7081 0.3941 0.3942 0.3939 0.9097 0.6344 1.9096 0.9979 1.0021
(0%;15%) 0.3624 0.2678 0.7076 0.3931 0.3936 0.3926 0.9091 0.6341 1.9095 0.9956 1.0044
SD SD
(5%;5%) 0.0154 0.01 0.0407 0.0125 0.0184 0.0185 0.0175 0.011 0.0539 0.0395 0.0395
(5%;10%) 0.0238 0.0155 0.0628 0.0199 0.0352 0.0185 0.0214 0.0125 0.0762 0.0589 0.0589
(5%;15%) 0.0331 0.0216 0.0872 0.028 0.052 0.0185 0.0263 0.0147 0.1019 0.0819 0.0819
(0%;10%) 0.0212 0.0138 0.0557 0.0176 0.0351 0.0069 0.0201 0.012 0.069 0.0537 0.0537
(0%;15%) 0.0317 0.0206 0.0829 0.0268 0.0526 0.0076 0.0254 0.0143 0.0974 0.0793 0.0793
Skew Skew
(5%;5%) 0.081 0.0596 0.1381 -0.0113 -0.0474 -0.0628 0.0617 0.0726 0.1316 0.0442 -0.0442
(5%;10%) -0.0125 -0.0441 0.1091 -0.1409 -0.1538 -0.0434 0.0797 0.053 0.154 -0.2237 0.2237
(5%;15%) -0.1309 -0.168 0.0562 -0.2925 -0.2127 -0.0296 -0.0118 0.0022 0.1084 -0.4102 0.4102
(0%;10%) -0.1549 -0.1841 -0.0554 -0.28 -0.1317 0.0194 0.015 0.0162 0.0153 -0.2676 0.2676
(0%;15%) -0.2899 -0.3459 -0.1216 -0.4724 -0.2188 -0.3453 -0.0787 -0.0766 -0.0417 -0.4743 0.4743
ExKurt ExKurt
(5%;5%) 0.0263 0.0435 0.0704 0.0284 0.0305 0.023 0.0524 0.0185 0.1022 0.0761 0.0761
(5%;10%) 0.0149 0.0572 0.0516 0.0748 0.0144 -0.0389 -0.0485 0.0443 0.0569 0.1537 0.1537
(5%;15%) 0.0749 0.1168 0.0685 0.2257 0.0111 0.1287 0.0176 -0.0075 0.0838 0.2837 0.2837
(0%;10%) 0.0461 0.025 -0.0512 0.1009 -0.0389 0.0621 0.1163 0.0009 -0.0578 0.1041 0.1041
(0%;15%) 0.2614 0.3263 0.0895 0.5188 0.0829 1.3969 0.1167 0.0802 0.0512 0.5243 0.5243
JB-PV JB-PV
(5%;5%) 0.0037 0.0351 0 0.2409 0.1271 0.0335 0.0238 0.0115 0 0.0588 0.0588
(5%;10%) 0.1615 0.0997 0 0 0 0.1525 0.0031 0.0638 0 0 0
(5%;15%) 0 0 0.0271 0 0 0.0153 0.1655 0.0158 0 0 0
(0%;10%) 0 0 0.0449 0 0 0.327 0.0497 0.1975 0.4102 0 0
(0%;15%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0003 0.002 0.1357 0 0
SR
(5%;5%) 1.9098 1.835 2.5762 3.2139 3.2122 3.2122
(5%;10%) 1.9041 1.8296 2.5688 3.2045 3.2028 3.2029
(5%;15%) 1.9004 1.8262 2.5638 3.1984 3.1966 3.1967
(0%;10%) 1.907 1.8324 2.5726 3.2093 3.2076 3.2076
(0%;15%) 1.9016 1.8271 2.5654 3.2003 3.1985 3.1986
TR
(5%;5%) 0.3445 0.3445 0.3445 0.3445 0.3445 0.3445
(5%;10%) 0.3435 0.3435 0.3435 0.3435 0.3435 0.3435
(5%;15%) 0.3429 0.3429 0.3429 0.3429 0.3429 0.3429
(0%;10%) 0.3441 0.3441 0.3441 0.3441 0.3441 0.3441
(0%;15%) 0.3431 0.3431 0.3431 0.3431 0.3431 0.3431
TABLE 6. Impact of risk-aversion coefﬁcients with dispersion in both
expected payoffs and covariance matrices of asset payoffs: (¾±1;¾±2) =
(1%;1%) and (¾²1;¾²2) = (1%;1%).39
Ea(~ r) ¯
Mean Mean
(¾±1;¾±2) A B C M O1 O2 A B C O1 O2
(1%;1%) 0.3633 0.2687 0.7087 0.3952 0.3952 0.3952 0.9079 0.6336 1.9088 1 1
(1%;2%) 0.3633 0.2687 0.7089 0.3956 0.3951 0.3961 0.9071 0.6327 1.9079 0.999 1.001
(1%;3%) 0.3632 0.2686 0.7087 0.396 0.3951 0.3968 0.9063 0.6318 1.9073 0.9985 1.0015
(0%;2%) 0.3632 0.2686 0.7089 0.3954 0.395 0.3959 0.9071 0.6329 1.9088 0.999 1.001
(0%;3%) 0.3636 0.2686 0.7088 0.3961 0.395 0.3972 0.9069 0.6316 1.9066 0.9979 1.0021
SD SD
(1%;1%) 0.0069 0.007 0.0071 0.0075 0.0083 0.0084 0.0204 0.0146 0.0346 0.0107 0.0107
(1%;2%) 0.0112 0.0112 0.0112 0.0118 0.0096 0.0161 0.0326 0.0233 0.055 0.0171 0.0171
(1%;3%) 0.0158 0.0159 0.0159 0.0167 0.0112 0.024 0.0467 0.0328 0.0773 0.0242 0.0242
(0%;2%) 0.01 0.01 0.0099 0.0106 0.0053 0.0159 0.0293 0.0204 0.0492 0.0153 0.0153
(0%;3%) 0.0152 0.0149 0.015 0.0157 0.0078 0.0236 0.044 0.0313 0.0729 0.0227 0.0227
Skew Skew
(1%;1%) 0.003 -0.0197 0.0301 0.0414 0.0286 0.0655 -0.0174 -0.0575 0.0666 -0.0168 0.0168
(1%;2%) 0.0295 0.0027 -0.0007 0.0466 0.0547 0.0693 -0.0028 -0.1246 0.0796 0.0046 -0.0046
(1%;3%) -0.0022 0.0525 -0.0477 0.1451 0.0839 0.177 -0.0385 -0.1504 0.0054 0.0388 -0.0388
(0%;2%) 0.0165 0.0134 0.0075 0.0775 0.0016 0.1028 -0.0239 -0.0868 0.0254 0.0315 -0.0315
(0%;3%) 0.0391 0.0288 0.0009 0.1075 -0.0014 0.1441 -0.0148 -0.1772 0.0157 0.052 -0.052
ExKurt ExKurt
(1%;1%) 0.0923 -0.068 -0.0733 -0.0524 -0.039 -0.005 -0.0015 -0.0135 -0.0579 -0.095 -0.095
(1%;2%) -0.0355 -0.0033 -0.1005 0 -0.0721 0.0286 0.015 -0.0211 0.004 0.0655 0.0655
(1%;3%) 0.0263 -0.0374 0.0024 -0.0155 -0.1174 0.0571 -0.042 -0.0918 0.0084 0.0431 0.0431
(0%;2%) 0.1105 0.0055 0.0123 0.0348 0.0185 0.0453 -0.0535 0.0916 0.0446 0.0049 0.0049
(0%;3%) 0.0278 0.0972 -0.034 -0.0169 -0.0628 0.0095 -0.0255 0.0684 0.0433 -0.0038 -0.0038
JB-PV JB-PV
(1%;1%) 0.1684 0.2757 0.1533 0.1356 0.3691 0.028 0.2239 0.0615 0.0124 0.1205 0.1205
(1%;2%) 0.3718 0.0084 0.1221 0.1643 0.028 0.0154 0.052 0 0.0051 0.4017 0.4017
(1%;3%) 0.1382 0.0752 0.15 0 0.0002 0 0.2012 0 0.0385 0.1939 0.1939
(0%;2%) 0.0628 0.1446 0.0751 0.0052 0.0704 0 0.3428 0.0003 0.3866 0.4361 0.4361
(0%;3%) 0.2385 0.0702 0.2144 0 0.4387 0 0.2721 0 0.449 0.105 0.105
SR
(1%;1%) 1.9114 1.8377 2.5783 3.2178 3.2169 3.2169
(1%;2%) 1.9116 1.8376 2.5791 3.2196 3.2175 3.2175
(1%;3%) 1.9104 1.8369 2.5786 3.2207 3.2165 3.2165
(0%;2%) 1.9107 1.8371 2.5793 3.2188 3.2172 3.2172
(0%;3%) 1.9129 1.8367 2.579 3.2214 3.2176 3.2176
TR
(1%;1%) 0.3452 0.3452 0.3452 0.3452 0.3452 0.3452
(1%;2%) 0.3456 0.3456 0.3456 0.3456 0.3456 0.3456
(1%;3%) 0.346 0.346 0.346 0.346 0.346 0.346
(0%;2%) 0.3454 0.3454 0.3454 0.3454 0.3454 0.3454
(0%;3%) 0.3461 0.3461 0.3461 0.3461 0.3461 0.3461
TABLE 7. Impact of heterogeneous beliefs in expected returns on mar-
ket equilibrium.40 HE AND SHI
Ea(~ r) ¯
Mean Mean
(¾²1;¾²2) A B C M O1 O2 A B C O1 O2
(1%;1%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7087 0.3989 0.399 0.3988 0.9 0.628 1.8923 1.0003 0.9997
(1%;2%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7087 0.4062 0.3989 0.4135 0.8854 0.6178 1.8615 0.9839 1.0161
(1%;3%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7087 0.54 0.3988 0.6812 0.8597 0.5998 1.8075 0.9553 1.0447
(0%;2%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7087 0.4035 0.3949 0.4121 0.8912 0.6218 1.8738 0.9811 1.0189
(0%;3%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7087 0.4656 0.3949 0.5362 0.8675 0.6053 1.8239 0.955 1.045
SD SD
(1%;1%) 0 0 0 0.0164 0.0228 0.0233 0.0421 0.0294 0.0884 0.046 0.046
(1%;2%) 0 0 0 0.03 0.023 0.0553 0.0706 0.0492 0.1484 0.0781 0.0781
(1%;3%) 0 0 0 11.5619 0.0228 23.124 0.1149 0.0802 0.2416 0.1283 0.1283
(0%;2%) 0 0 0 0.0275 0 0.055 0.0644 0.045 0.1355 0.0709 0.0709
(0%;3%) 0 0 0 4.5271 0 9.0542 0.1092 0.0762 0.2295 0.1202 0.1202
Skew Skew
(1%;1%) n/a n/a n/a 0.2749 0.3419 0.4378 0.008 0.008 0.008 -0.0662 0.0662
(1%;2%) n/a n/a n/a 1.274 0.4041 1.5679 -0.273 -0.273 -0.273 -0.3393 0.3393
(1%;3%) n/a n/a n/a 99.9677 0.3844 99.9679 -0.9851 -0.9851 -0.9851 -1.0222 1.0222
(0%;2%) n/a n/a n/a 1.6325 n/a 1.6325 -0.5349 -0.5349 -0.5349 -0.5349 0.5349
(0%;3%) n/a n/a n/a 99.8536 n/a 99.8536 -1.0829 -1.0829 -1.0829 -1.0829 1.0829
ExKurt ExKurt
(1%;1%) n/a n/a n/a 0.1298 0.2681 0.5305 -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0056 -0.0056
(1%;2%) n/a n/a n/a 7.2506 0.2919 9.6691 0.7263 0.7263 0.7263 0.6553 0.6553
(1%;3%) n/a n/a n/a 9992.6892 0.4107 9992.7084 3.1604 3.1604 3.1604 3.0742 3.0742
(0%;2%) n/a n/a n/a 10.4256 n/a 10.4256 1.2405 1.2405 1.2405 1.2405 1.2405
(0%;3%) n/a n/a n/a 9977.335 n/a 9977.335 3.7342 3.7342 3.7342 3.7342 3.7342
JB-PV JB-PV
(1%;1%) n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0 0.0548 0.0548 0.0548 0.0257 0.0257
(1%;2%) n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(1%;3%) n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0%;2%) n/a n/a n/a 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0%;3%) n/a n/a n/a 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0
SR
(1%;1%) 1.9191 1.8543 2.5833 3.2342 3.2262 3.2262
(1%;2%) 1.9343 1.8819 2.5944 3.2662 3.2433 3.2472
(1%;3%) 1.9653 1.9672 2.6061 3.3538 3.2695 3.3185
(0%;2%) 1.9305 1.8712 2.588 3.2542 3.2347 3.239
(0%;3%) 1.9553 1.9449 2.5998 3.329 3.2579 3.2979
TR
(1%;1%) 0.3489 0.3489 0.3489 0.3489 0.3489 0.3489
(1%;2%) 0.3562 0.3562 0.3562 0.3562 0.3562 0.3562
(1%;3%) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
(0%;2%) 0.3535 0.3535 0.3535 0.3535 0.3535 0.3535
(0%;3%) 0.4156 0.4156 0.4156 0.4156 0.4156 0.4156
TABLE 8. Impact of heterogeneous beliefs in variance/covariance of
asset returns on market equilibrium.41
Ea(~ r) ¯
Mean Mean
(¾µ1;¾µ2) A B C M O1 O2 A B C O1 O2
(5%;5%) 0.3634 0.2687 0.7088 0.3961 0.3961 0.396 0.9069 0.6328 1.9068 1 1
(5%;10%) 0.3634 0.2686 0.7087 0.3971 0.396 0.3983 0.9058 0.6318 1.9042 0.9986 1.0014
(5%;15%) 0.3632 0.2688 0.7088 0.3999 0.3958 0.4041 0.9013 0.6294 1.896 0.9937 1.0063
(0%;10%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7086 0.397 0.3951 0.3989 0.9058 0.6318 1.904 0.9972 1.0028
(0%;15%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7088 0.3997 0.3953 0.404 0.9021 0.6294 1.8969 0.9938 1.0062
SD SD
(5%;5%) 0.007 0.0071 0.0071 0.0143 0.0194 0.0193 0.0386 0.0268 0.0756 0.0372 0.0372
(5%;10%) 0.0071 0.0071 0.007 0.0212 0.0192 0.0369 0.0554 0.0387 0.1127 0.0574 0.0574
(5%;15%) 0.0071 0.0071 0.0071 0.0306 0.0191 0.0574 0.0755 0.0529 0.1565 0.0806 0.0806
(0%;10%) 0.0071 0.0071 0.0071 0.0198 0.0083 0.0375 0.0509 0.0353 0.1038 0.0522 0.0522
(0%;15%) 0.0071 0.0071 0.0072 0.0302 0.0083 0.0591 0.0737 0.0513 0.1519 0.0782 0.0782
Skew Skew
(5%;5%) 0.0201 0.0053 0.0216 0.1914 0.2813 0.3084 0.0468 0.0129 0.0586 -0.0332 0.0332
(5%;10%) -0.0264 -0.0076 0.0631 0.3848 0.2598 0.572 -0.006 -0.0624 -0.0532 -0.1756 0.1756
(5%;15%) -0.0241 -0.0288 -0.0214 0.8734 0.2417 1.0491 -0.2506 -0.2354 -0.2746 -0.3785 0.3785
(0%;10%) -0.0003 -0.0594 0.0319 0.5916 0.0518 0.6718 -0.219 -0.2257 -0.2605 -0.3168 0.3168
(0%;15%) -0.0198 0.0143 0.0211 1.1664 0.0844 1.2213 -0.4233 -0.4292 -0.4391 -0.484 0.484
ExKurt ExKurt
(5%;5%) -0.016 0.078 0.0013 0.0621 0.1875 0.105 0.0324 0.0041 0.0351 0.0581 0.0581
(5%;10%) 0.0722 0.0366 0.0362 0.1857 0.1064 0.4766 0.0064 -0.04 -0.0472 0.0464 0.0464
(5%;15%) -0.135 0.0576 -0.0014 1.672 0.1425 2.2404 0.2009 0.2822 0.253 0.3526 0.3526
(0%;10%) 0.0029 0.0449 -0.0147 0.6724 0.0633 0.8216 0.134 0.1151 0.1215 0.1721 0.1721
(0%;15%) 0.0339 -0.0458 0.0342 3.3556 0.0221 3.555 0.5308 0.4949 0.5706 0.6042 0.6042
JB-PV JB-PV
(5%;5%) 0.322 0.2747 0.3227 0 0 0 0.1292 0.1323 0.0441 0.1978 0.1978
(5%;10%) 0.189 0.2793 0.0277 0 0 0 0.0375 0.028 0.0596 0 0
(5%;15%) 0.0138 0.2513 0.3168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0%;10%) 0.0018 0.0347 0.4086 0 0.0464 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0%;15%) 0.4313 0.4553 0.4598 0 0.0024 0 0 0 0 0 0
SR
(5%;5%) 1.9118 1.8376 2.5788 3.2182 3.2174 3.2174
(5%;10%) 1.9117 1.8369 2.5784 3.2176 3.2168 3.2168
(5%;15%) 1.9107 1.8382 2.5787 3.218 3.2172 3.2172
(0%;10%) 1.9116 1.837 2.5781 3.2175 3.2166 3.2167
(0%;15%) 1.9112 1.8371 2.5787 3.2177 3.2169 3.2169
TR
(5%;5%) 0.3461 0.3461 0.3461 0.3461 0.3461 0.3461
(5%;10%) 0.3471 0.3471 0.3471 0.3471 0.3471 0.3471
(5%;15%) 0.3499 0.3499 0.3499 0.3499 0.3499 0.3499
(0%;10%) 0.347 0.347 0.347 0.347 0.347 0.347
(0%;15%) 0.3497 0.3497 0.3497 0.3497 0.3497 0.3497
TABLE 9. Impact of ARA coefﬁcients with heterogeneous beliefs in
expected returns.42 HE AND SHI
Ea(~ r) ¯
Mean Mean
(¾µ1;¾µ2) A B C M O1 O2 A B C O1 O2
(5%;5%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7087 0.3999 0.3999 0.3999 0.8985 0.6269 1.8891 1.0001 0.9999
(5%;10%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7087 0.4011 0.3996 0.4026 0.8972 0.626 1.8863 0.9976 1.0024
(5%;15%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7087 0.4029 0.3998 0.4061 0.8958 0.625 1.8834 0.9966 1.0034
(0%;10%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7087 0.4009 0.3987 0.4031 0.8971 0.6259 1.8861 0.9964 1.0036
(0%;15%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7087 0.4035 0.3989 0.4081 0.894 0.6237 1.8795 0.9933 1.0067
SD SD
(5%;5%) 0 0 0 0.0206 0.0289 0.029 0.0526 0.0367 0.1105 0.0576 0.0576
(5%;10%) 0 0 0 0.0259 0.0291 0.0429 0.0653 0.0456 0.1374 0.0725 0.0725
(5%;15%) 0 0 0 0.0343 0.0291 0.0619 0.0839 0.0585 0.1763 0.0919 0.0919
(0%;10%) 0 0 0 0.0247 0.023 0.0438 0.0621 0.0433 0.1305 0.069 0.069
(0%;15%) 0 0 0 0.0337 0.0231 0.0632 0.0811 0.0566 0.1705 0.0897 0.0897
Skew Skew
(5%;5%) n/a n/a n/a 0.2718 0.383 0.3853 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.011 -0.011
(5%;10%) n/a n/a n/a 0.4041 0.3851 0.6125 0.0588 0.0588 0.0588 -0.1118 0.1118
(5%;15%) n/a n/a n/a 0.7492 0.3671 0.9992 -0.0818 -0.0818 -0.0818 -0.267 0.267
(0%;10%) n/a n/a n/a 0.4505 0.3388 0.595 -0.0124 -0.0124 -0.0124 -0.0986 0.0986
(0%;15%) n/a n/a n/a 0.8861 0.4042 1.0542 -0.2119 -0.2119 -0.2119 -0.3284 0.3284
ExKurt ExKurt
(5%;5%) n/a n/a n/a 0.0954 0.2738 0.3192 -0.0218 -0.0218 -0.0218 -0.014 -0.014
(5%;10%) n/a n/a n/a 0.3638 0.4319 0.7356 0.0872 0.0872 0.0872 -0.0144 -0.0144
(5%;15%) n/a n/a n/a 1.3809 0.2761 2.194 0.1195 0.1195 0.1195 0.1322 0.1322
(0%;10%) n/a n/a n/a 0.4348 0.2935 0.744 0.0315 0.0315 0.0315 0.0789 0.0789
(0%;15%) n/a n/a n/a 1.809 0.5389 2.3755 0.1425 0.1425 0.1425 0.2203 0.2203
JB-PV JB-PV
(5%;5%) n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0 0.0074 0.0074 0.0074 0.1324 0.1324
(5%;10%) n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0 0.0115 0.0115 0.0115 0 0
(5%;15%) n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0 0
(0%;10%) n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0 0.2842 0.2842 0.2842 0 0
(0%;15%) n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SR
(5%;5%) 1.9207 1.8542 2.5825 3.2342 3.2262 3.2262
(5%;10%) 1.92 1.8525 2.5843 3.2345 3.2264 3.2265
(5%;15%) 1.9195 1.8538 2.583 3.234 3.2259 3.226
(0%;10%) 1.9216 1.8524 2.5842 3.235 3.2268 3.227
(0%;15%) 1.922 1.8531 2.5833 3.2347 3.2264 3.2266
TR
(5%;5%) 0.3499 0.3499 0.3499 0.3499 0.3499 0.3499
(5%;10%) 0.3511 0.3511 0.3511 0.3511 0.3511 0.3511
(5%;15%) 0.3529 0.3529 0.3529 0.3529 0.3529 0.3529
(0%;10%) 0.3509 0.3509 0.3509 0.3509 0.3509 0.3509
(0%;15%) 0.3535 0.3535 0.3535 0.3535 0.3535 0.3535
TABLE 10. Impact of ARA coefﬁcients with heterogeneous beliefs in
variance/covaraince of asset returns.43
Ea(~ r) ¯
Mean Mean
(¾µ1;¾µ2) A B C M O1 O2 A B C O1 O2
(5%;5%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7087 0.4001 0.4001 0.4 0.8981 0.6265 1.8888 1.0001 0.9999
(5%;10%) 0.3633 0.2686 0.7087 0.4015 0.4002 0.4028 0.8963 0.6254 1.8848 0.9983 1.0017
(5%;15%) 0.3633 0.2685 0.7087 0.4038 0.3998 0.4078 0.8937 0.623 1.879 0.9943 1.0057
(0%;10%) 0.3634 0.2686 0.7087 0.4009 0.3993 0.4026 0.8975 0.626 1.8867 0.9979 1.0021
(0%;15%) 0.3635 0.2686 0.7088 0.4028 0.3992 0.4063 0.8963 0.6248 1.8837 0.996 1.004
SD SD
(5%;5%) 0.007 0.007 0.0071 0.0219 0.0307 0.03 0.056 0.0392 0.1153 0.0594 0.0594
(5%;10%) 0.0071 0.0071 0.0071 0.0271 0.0302 0.0443 0.0686 0.0479 0.1417 0.0741 0.0741
(5%;15%) 0.0071 0.0071 0.0072 0.035 0.0301 0.0625 0.0857 0.0597 0.1781 0.0926 0.0926
(0%;10%) 0.0071 0.0072 0.0071 0.0258 0.0247 0.0444 0.0652 0.0457 0.1347 0.0697 0.0697
(0%;15%) 0.0072 0.0071 0.0072 0.0338 0.0244 0.0624 0.0823 0.0574 0.1715 0.0889 0.0889
Skew Skew
(5%;5%) 0.0013 -0.0071 -0.0003 0.3035 0.4145 0.3907 0.1016 0.1224 0.067 0.0205 -0.0205
(5%;10%) 0.0159 0.0414 0.0121 0.3848 0.3397 0.584 0.1014 0.1048 0.0832 -0.0853 0.0853
(5%;15%) 0.0103 -0.0265 -0.0048 0.707 0.3485 0.9495 -0.0265 -0.024 -0.0369 -0.1974 0.1974
(0%;10%) -0.0203 0.0002 0.0417 0.4271 0.3928 0.6023 0.042 0.0487 0.0328 -0.1183 0.1183
(0%;15%) -0.009 0.0134 0.0087 0.8419 0.3717 1.052 -0.1581 -0.1387 -0.1707 -0.3047 0.3047
ExKurt ExKurt
(5%;5%) -0.0374 -0.048 -0.0327 0.2458 0.4393 0.4387 0.0603 0.0505 0.069 0.0672 0.0672
(5%;10%) -0.0097 0.0324 0.0365 0.3801 0.0907 0.7661 0.1435 0.0554 0.0899 -0.0732 -0.0732
(5%;15%) 0.0324 0.0199 0.0254 1.3076 0.2327 2.0648 0.1076 0.1312 0.1132 0.1496 0.1496
(0%;10%) 0.0394 -0.0811 -0.0242 0.4587 0.5774 0.7941 0.0578 0.0467 0.092 0.074 0.074
(0%;15%) -0.0835 -0.0016 0.0594 1.7181 0.2675 2.3427 0.1894 0.1822 0.1915 0.2203 0.2203
JB-PV JB-PV
(5%;5%) 0.2536 0.4063 0.1998 0 0 0 0 0 0.0088 0.2747 0.2747
(5%;10%) 0.2064 0.1925 0.3297 0 0 0 0 0 0.0006 0.0008 0.0008
(5%;15%) 0.2644 0.488 0.1423 0 0 0 0.0498 0.0171 0.0223 0 0
(0%;10%) 0.4861 0.2542 0.2082 0 0 0 0.1148 0.0878 0.0702 0 0
(0%;15%) 0.2187 0.1402 0.4507 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SR
(5%;5%) 1.9202 1.8527 2.5836 3.2349 3.2261 3.226
(5%;10%) 1.923 1.8538 2.5835 3.2364 3.2275 3.2276
(5%;15%) 1.9199 1.8526 2.5835 3.2347 3.2258 3.226
(0%;10%) 1.9204 1.8526 2.5852 3.2361 3.2272 3.2273
(0%;15%) 1.9211 1.8523 2.5842 3.2355 3.2266 3.2267
TR
(5%;5%) 0.3501 0.3501 0.3501 0.3501 0.3501 0.3501
(5%;10%) 0.3515 0.3515 0.3515 0.3515 0.3515 0.3515
(5%;15%) 0.3538 0.3538 0.3538 0.3538 0.3538 0.3538
(0%;10%) 0.3509 0.3509 0.3509 0.3509 0.3509 0.3509
(0%;15%) 0.3528 0.3528 0.3528 0.3528 0.3528 0.3528
TABLE 11. Impact of ARA coefﬁcients with heterogeneous beliefs in
both expected returns and variance/covaraince of returns.